

The MARINE CORPS GAZETTE

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MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

BY MAJOR RALPH S. KEYSER, U.S.M.C.

IN war, reliable information of the enemy is as necessary as it is difficult to obtain. The most successful military operations of history have been those that were based on accurate knowledge of the enemy—his numbers, movements and intentions. The brilliant victories of Stonewall Jackson in his valley campaign and the general success of the Confederate Army under Lee in Virginia during 1861-62, when forces vastly inferior numerically not only operated freely, but attacked successfully superior forces, are as much examples of the value of timely and accurate enemy information as they are a tribute to the skill of those great generals.

A commander without definite enemy information is invariably hesitating in his plans and compromising in his troop disposition. Like a man walking in the dark, he must grope his way instead of striking out with the boldness that comes from confidence and spells success.

Military intelligence is more than reliable information, it is reliable information furnished in time to permit of appropriate action. It may be classified under several heads, according to the source from which it comes and the method of obtaining it. In a very general way all military intelligence is obtained after the beginning of hostilities, either by FORCE or FRAUD. Field Intelligence, or as I prefer, Front-line Intelligence, is obtained by force, while that obtained by the use of spies, agents in neutral countries, examination of the mails and the various and sundry agencies for the gathering of information as developed by the modern war is gotten by fraud. On this occasion we are interested in front-line intelligence only; that is to say, *all information obtained by troops in contact with the enemy's forces.* This class of intelligence might well be subdivided into TACTICAL and STRATEGIC. By tactical, we mean a class of information that

controls or affects our tactical dispositions. It is generally of most importance to the local troops. Strategic intelligence affects or controls strategic plans and is usually of little interest to any one but the supreme commander. To distinguish between these two classes of intelligence the following example is cited: A new hostile regiment enters the front line and its identity, disposition, etc., is ascertained. Under the above classification such details as the disposition of the various units of the regiment, battle effectives and morale would be of tactical value and be mainly of interest to the local commander, while the important information to the supreme commander and what might possibly control his strategical plans would be the numerical designation of the regiment.

Because the mass of information troops are called upon to supply comes under the strategic classification, the intelligence personnel from the private, acting as observer or scout, to the head of the organization must be highly indoctrinated with the value and importance of this class of information, and be active in their efforts to overcome the natural indifference shown by the troops towards it.

This point furnishes one of the greatest problems an intelligence organization has to face. I use the expression "natural indifference," advisedly, because certainly it is natural for troops surrounded by the dangers and the presence of the enemy to think only in terms of their own safety and self-preservation. They can be expected to show little concern for matters that do not affect them directly.

It requires a very high indoctrination to obtain the hearty cooperation of the troops that is so necessary for success in gaining complete and constant enemy information. If you will pause to consider what is asked of the troops and look at the subject from their standpoint, you will appreciate how they feel about it. To them it makes little difference just what regiment of the enemy is opposing them. He is the enemy and is occupying a certain position; that to the average officer and man is sufficient information. But it is not enough from the intelligence standpoint, so the troops are compelled to endure the dangers and hardships of constant patrolling and perhaps must suffer heavy losses in getting prisoners it may be for the sole purpose of identifying the particular regiment the enemy has in line opposite them.

The methods and means of obtaining front-line intelligence are varied and many. Aeroplane reconnaissance, advance cavalry, patrols, observation posts, listening posts, sentinels, interrogation of prisoners, deserters and inhabitants and the examination of captured documents and equipment are the important ones.

In past wars, cavalry was the sole reliance of commanders to obtain front-line intelligence and at the same time to deny such information to the enemy. In the recent World War, as it was waged on the western front, the aeroplane and the infantry supplanted the cavalry as the main source from which this information was obtained. Early in 1914 before the opposing forces came together, cavalry was as extensively used as in previous wars; but after the first clash, when both sides settled down in deadly grapple, the time for cavalry had passed and the infantry and aeroplane became the reliance of both sides to gather information of their opponents. This is believed to be the normal development of modern war. If we consider the conditions on the western front in their true light, we see it as one long protracted battle. While it cannot be denied that this great battle was peculiar to this war and distinctive in that both flanks rested on impassable objects—the North Sea, on the one hand, and the mountains of neutral Switzerland, on the other, nevertheless, with the enormous size of modern armies and the speed of present-day means of communication which make possible such large armies and their control and supply, the supreme commander has the means of offering battle on a wide front and therefore the choice of the very strongest obstacles for the security of his flanks. These conditions, if true, can only result in long protracted battles lasting weeks instead of days.

What bearing has this on front-line intelligence, the subject we are now discussing? Simply that the development of the intelligence service and the practices used in this war are normal and meet our future needs; and that these methods, practices and organization, found expedient in this war, must be taught during peace time to our infantry, with the same care and thoroughness as is now given its kindred subject, tactics.

It is a principle of modern intelligence that the supreme commander receive a constant flow of enemy information from every unit of his command while it is in contact with the enemy, this information to continue even during battle.

We will now consider the organization and personnel of the intelligence service of an infantry division found necessary by our experience in France for accomplishing this principle.

Organization of the Intelligence Service of an Infantry Division.

Division Headquarters:

- 1 major or lieutenant colonel (Assistant Chief of Staff, Chief of Second Section, General Staff).
- 1 captain (Division Intelligence Officer).
- 1 first lieutenant or captain Engineer Corps (in charge of Topographical sub-section).
- 1 first or second lieutenant (in charge of Divisional Observers).
- 1 second lieutenant (interpreter) (interrogation and handling of prisoners and translation of enemy documents).
- 1 regimental sergeant major (in charge of office).
- 1 Bn. sergeant major (stenographer).
- 1 sergeant (clerk).
- 1 sergeant (interpreter) (interrogation of prisoners and translation of documents).
- 2 sergeants (Chief observers).
- 2 corporals (Observers).
- 4 privates (Observers).
- 1 Bn. sergeant major, Engineer Corps (Chief Draftsman).
- 1 sergeant, Engineer Corps (Draftsman).
- 2 corporals, Engineer Corps (Draftsmen).
- 2 privates, Engineer Corps (Draftsmen).
- 3 privates (Officers' Orderlies).

Each Infantry Brigade Headquarters:

- 1 captain or first lieutenant (Brigade Intelligence Officer).

Each Infantry Regimental Headquarters:

- 1 captain (Regimental Intelligence Officer).
- 1 sergeant (Interpreter and clerk).
- 1 sergeant (Draftsman).
- 1 sergeant (Chief Observer).
- 2 corporals (Observers).
- 12 privates first class (Observers).
- 1 private (Officers' Orderly).

Each Infantry Battalion Headquarters:

- 1 first lieutenant (Bn. Intelligence Officer).
- 1 sergeant (Chief Scout).
- 4 corporals (Scouts).
- 28 privates first class (Scouts).
- 1 sergeant (Chief Observer).
- 2 corporals (Observers).
- 12 privates first class (Observers).

Artillery Brigade Headquarters:

- 1 captain or first lieutenant (Brigade Intelligence Officer).

Each Artillery Regimental Headquarters:

- 1 captain (Regimental Intelligence Officer).

Each Artillery Bn. Headquarters:

- 1 first lieutenant (Bn. Intelligence Officer).
- Enlisted scouts and observers are detailed from the batteries as required.

It may clear the subject somewhat if we now discuss in some detail the duties of the various officers and units of the divisional intelligence organizations as outlined above.

The Assistant Chief of Staff (G-2) is responsible to his chief of staff and chief of the intelligence section of the Army Corps in which the division happens to be serving for the efficiency of the intelligence service of the division, and he directs and controls the entire organization. His principal duty is to keep his chief of staff informed of all enemy information and be prepared to interpret its meaning and significance. He must work in absolute harmony and coöperation with the operations section (G-3). He must know all that G-3 is doing or even planning to do. There is a tendency for the intelligence service to obtain information for the sake of intelligence alone. This is wholly wrong. The aim that should prompt all effort to seek information of the enemy should be to aid present or contemplated operations.

I again wish to emphasize the necessity for the closest coöperation between intelligence and operations. During battle there should be an automatic interchange between the two sections of copies of all field messages and reports received. Once each day

the regimental intelligence officers should go forward to the front-line battalions to gather first-hand information from them. The Divisional Intelligence Officer should visit each regimental headquarters daily. The opportunity afforded by these visits for asking questions and discussion amply repay for the time and trouble they consume. They frequently develop important enemy information that was overlooked in submitting formal reports. An additional advantage, and not an insignificant one, is that it brings the higher units in personal contact with the lower ones and tends to harmonious and efficient coöperation.

The Divisional Intelligence Officer is an assistant to the assistant chief of staff in a general sense and has the particular duty of preparing the DAILY SUMMARY OF INTELLIGENCE.

Officer in Charge of Divisional Observers is responsible for the effective operation of the divisional observation post. He directs the training of the personnel, selects sites for observation posts and maintains communication between the post and division headquarters.

Divisional Topographical Officer has the duty of procuring the necessary maps and photographs and is responsible for their proper distribution to the troops through the Message Centre. He directs all topographical work that may be required by the sections of the division general staff and should be an expert on the interpretation of aeroplane photographs.

The Interpreter has charge of the interrogation, searching, recording and sending to the rear of all prisoners of war and the translation of captured documents. He should be thoroughly conversant with the language of the enemy and an expert on the enemy's military organization.

Brigade Intelligence Officer is merely to coördinate the intelligence activities of the two regiments and to keep his commanding general informed of all enemy information gathered within the brigade. He is responsible for the coöperation of the regimental observation posts when the regiments are in line abreast. He receives a daily intelligence report from the regiments and forwards them, without summarizing, to Division Headquarters, requiring one copy for his information and files.

The Regimental Intelligence Officer is responsible for the efficiency of the entire regimental intelligence organization. He directs the training of the headquarters personnel and exercises supervision over the training of the battalions. When more than

one battalion is in line at a time he coördinates their efforts. He maintains close touch with the Regimental Operations Officer and in coöperation with that officer directs all patrolling that may be required on the regimental front. He should make himself an expert on everything pertaining to the enemy—his defenses, organization and habits; and be prepared to furnish his colonel and the higher commanders the information pertaining to the enemy on his front that they may require. When his regiment is in contact with the enemy he maintains one or two observation posts, the number depending on the terrain, and superintends the location of battalion observation posts. He requires a daily report from each of his battalions that is in line, giving, under appropriate headings, all information of the enemy that was gathered during the twenty-four hours. He summarizes this information and after submitting it to his colonel, forwards it to Division Headquarters via the brigade. He arranges for the systematic collection of enemy documents and samples of new arms and equipment and forwards them to Division Headquarters. He subjects all prisoners, deserters and noncombatants to a hasty interrogation, limiting his questions to matters of tactical importance and those necessary to establish identification of enemy units. He should immediately transmit information establishing new identifications to Division Headquarters and send all prisoners and other persons promptly to the Division, where a more detailed interrogation is given them.

In battle he must maintain observation posts and see that they have good communication with regimental headquarters. He must arrange for groups of intelligence personnel to go over the battlefield and collect documents and look for new arms and equipment. These groups should follow the assault battalions so as to collect this valuable material before the troops have a chance to destroy or remove it.

The Battalion Intelligence Officer: The battalion is the source of nearly all front-line intelligence. It is the smallest tactical unit having a complete information service and is the element through which the intelligence organization of the division comes in direct contact with the enemy. Patrolling is the battalion's most important duty from the intelligence standpoint and patrols are the main reliance for gathering accurate knowledge of the enemy.

The battalion intelligence officer must be a man of good judgment, courageous, and untiring in his energy. He has charge of the training and directs the activities of the battalion scouts and observers. He should maintain the closest touch with the company and platoon commanders and be always ready to furnish them and the higher commanders with detailed information of the enemy on his front. When the battalion is in contact with the enemy he should maintain one or more observation posts in order to keep the enemy's position under constant observation day and night. He should be consulted before any patrolling operations are undertaken and be prepared to furnish information regarding routes for such patrols, enemy activities, etc. He should occasionally lead a patrol in order to gain additional information and experience of the enemy. Neither he nor his men should be used to do all the patrolling for the battalion; as by so doing the troops would lose the advantage of patrolling as a factor in keeping up their offensive spirit and would fail to gain the experience and knowledge resulting from such operations. Another reason that makes the practice inadvisable is the heavy casualties sometimes suffered by patrols. The battalion can ill afford large losses among such skilled and highly trained men as constitute the intelligence personnel. A few battalion scouts should accompany every patrol as experts on the enemy's position and to act as leading men in the patrol. They should be selected preferably from the men of the scout group that originally belonged to the company which is furnishing the patrol so that they will be known and therefore inspire greater confidence.

The battalion intelligence officer prepares a daily intelligence report containing, under appropriate headings, all the information of the enemy gathered within the twenty-four hours. This report should be submitted to the major and forwarded at a prescribed hour to regimental headquarters.

During battle, by an energetic use of his scouts and observers, he keeps the major and higher commanders informed of the enemy and the progress of our own troops in the fight.

During an offensive he should not attempt to use fixed observation posts after the attack is launched, but direct his observers to high ground and commanding objects where a view of the enemy's lines can best be obtained.

Ground Observation:
(Observation Posts).

With the exception of the brigade, every unit from the battalion to an army corps maintains one or more observation posts while in contact with the enemy.

The object of these posts is to keep the enemy's lines and back areas under constant observation day and night, and in that way gather as much information as possible of his intentions, dispositions, movements, habits and defensive works.

These posts may be hastily improvised lookouts, placed in trees, tall buildings or on commanding ground where the desired view of the terrain may be obtained; or, as in a highly organized trench sector, they may be very elaborately constructed of concrete, proof against the heaviest artillery and with precautions taken in great detail for their concealment.

There are a few general rules to be considered in selecting the site for an observation post. First, bear in mind the purpose of the post is *TO SEE AND NOT BE SEEN*. Therefore it must be inconspicuous and present a good view of the ground to be observed. Second, the post must have good means of communication either by wire, visual or runner.

In determining how much of the enemy's position should be observed from an observation post, the rule is that *a unit observes the enemy's position equal to its own depth*. For example, a battalion would observe the front ground, a regiment the middle ground, the division the back ground and the army corps should confine its observation to the area in rear of the position with special attention paid to the important highways and railroads in the back area.

When preparing for an offensive all observation posts should be moved forward to more advanced positions. The reason for this is that the critical times in an attack are the jump-off and during the consolidation, if the attack is to have a limited objective, and all higher commanders are anxious for prompt news during these two phases of the attack. Therefore the initial observation post of the unit should be located well forward so as to assure a good view of the hostile front line and to facilitate their movement forward as the attack progresses.

As the assaulting line advances, the observation posts should leap-frog forward, the rear observation post functioning until

the forward one has been located and communication with its headquarters established. In an attack with a limited objective, the location of the final observation post should be such as to give close observation of the ground most likely to be used by the enemy for counter-attack. Their aim should be to give warning in time to permit the employment of artillery concentrations against such danger.

I cannot do better than close this article with a *PLEA*: A plea for an appreciation by the senior officers of the Marine Corps of the value of a trained intelligence organization to any body of Marines taking the field. The World War demonstrated the value of such an organization in a conflict of that magnitude; but how about the minor operations which the Marine Corps is called upon to conduct in times of peace?

In a recent talk on "Small Wars" by Brigadier General Smedley D. Butler, U. S. Marine Corps, before the Field Officers' school at Quantico it was brought out very forcefully and very correctly that such "wars" are fought for *persons* and not *causes* and when the persons are removed the "war" is over.

As this is unquestionably true, I can see a great field of usefulness for a well organized and highly trained intelligence personnel composed of officers and men who can speak Spanish and are well versed in the geography and the political and social conditions in the countries to the south of us in which the Marine Corps is likely to operate.

CONTENTMENT AS A FACTOR IN MORALE

BY CAPTAIN EARL H. JENKINS, U.S.M.C.

PSYCHOLOGISTS have proved that irascible and depressing emotions cause the energy-giving glands to secrete poisons into the blood, while happy emotions stimulate the cells to provide more energy.¹ This is a comparatively new discovery, and yet we are told by the author of "Proverbs" (17:24) that "a cheerful heart is good medicine: but a broken spirit drieth up the bones." Whether we accept the Bible as an inspired volume or not, no one will question its literary value, and no one will deny that it is the greatest code of morals yet given to man. Contentment is emphasized over and over again in Holy Writ. It is even placed in the same category as Godliness.²

Respect has a special significance. It is concerned with what is deemed to be of real worth.

Confidence, too, is none the less specific and concerns itself with that in which trust may be imposed.

Contentment is general. It affects the entire character. It may attach itself to some specific cause, but it extends itself to the whole mental attitude. Its etymology is significant—*con* (together) and *tenere* (to hold). It is the mental quality which holds together the whole character. Discontent may begin in some real or fancied cause and extend itself to the whole character. More than any other of the fundamental traits, contentment feeds upon itself. Discontent breeds discontentment.

The ancients defined happiness as the proper functioning of man in any given environment. Contentment is a kind of passive happiness and may also be defined as the proper functioning of man in any given environment.

Some environments which we necessarily encounter in the service are certainly not conducive to contentment. The company commander will therefore be called upon to overcome objectionable conditions and assist nature in her work of maintaining healthy minds and bodies, that man may function properly. The

¹ Peace, Power and Plenty, by O. S. Marden.

² I Tim. 6:6, "Godliness with contentment is great gain."

establishment of an environment which induces health of mind and body is the "decision" which compels the success of the mission—to have a contented organization.

Hunger, poverty, suffering, undoubtedly produce discontent. Man cannot function properly if his physical and mental needs are wanting, or if his natural rights are not granted.

Labor to-day is demanding what it terms a living wage, and by this is to be understood not only the comforts of life, but a share in its luxuries. We rightly rejoice that the conditions of living for labor, in America, are far ahead of what obtains in the Old World. One of the great messages of the twentieth century civilization to the whole world is to relieve suffering, to raise the standard of living to a point where hunger, poverty and distress will not foster a discontent that shall clog the wheels of progress. This message comes to the service as well as to labor, and we must undertake the same change. The analogy of labor's demand for the comforts of life and a share in its luxuries is found in the silent demand of the service for those same privileges. (Compulsion is still a vital factor of discipline, but is no longer *prior jure*, but the *dernier ressort*.)

Labor is demanding a share in the tariff revenue which is made high enough to protect American labor from the pauper labor of some other countries. The legitimate demands of labor are being met and its requests given every consideration. Profit-sharing systems are being promoted by the big industrial concerns in order to give labor an interest in its work and to act as an incentive to better effort.

The organization, administration and requirements of the service prohibit any financial participation in success. Our compensation for efficiency must be sought by other than monetary rewards. Promotion is an acknowledgment of worth and is about the only tangible reward we have for efficiency. We must have buck privates and, were every private as accomplished as the best sergeant, we could not promote them. Their reward would be of a moral character and would consist of a realization that they are parts of an efficient machine.

Profit-sharing has no equivalent in the military service. We must seek another kind of reward for efficiency. If the various organizations in the service were rated as to individual and collective efficiency, and their pay was regulated according to their

position on the list, then we would have a profit-sharing system equal to any industrial concern. But this is highly impracticable and cannot be undertaken under the varying circumstances and conditions encountered in the service.

Again, the laborer, if he be wise, will be content with a reasonable return for his labor, and not push his demands to a point where reaction is certain to occur. It is not our province to go further into this economic question. It suffices for us to lay down the general principle that the wise man will make himself content when physical conditions are reasonable.

There is a motto, *Felix sorte mea*—happy in my lot. It is possible to be content in suffering and travail, but civilization does not ask this. It does ask, however, that contentment be found when reasonable provision is made for physical comfort. An individual, appreciative of efforts made in his behalf, is a valuable soldier, as well as citizen. It may be stated as a fact that all officers and noncommissioned officers try to make their organization efficient, and were these efforts realized and appreciated by the men, we would suffer little from discontent. Such a realization tends to foster a mutual helpfulness which is a powerful incentive to good order and discipline.

Much is said and written about officers having a sympathetic understanding of their men. This understanding should be mutual and reciprocal. Officers need the men's sympathy probably even more than the men need the officers'. It becomes the officers' duty, though—as their leaders—to create this feeling of mutual sympathy. The men should be indoctrinated with a sense of appreciation in order to help their officers. Some measure of this reciprocal feeling may be induced in the men by talks to them by senior officers. Noncommissioned officers should especially be imbued with this feeling, as they are the channels through which the streams of thought and action are communicated from junior to senior and from senior to junior.

In the service everyone strives toward contentment. Its value is not, cannot, be overestimated. Contentment contributes a strong arm to discipline; it reduces offenses, promotes harmony, and keeps the organization in which it exists in the buoyant spirit of mutual helpfulness. Among the principal elements which contribute to a contented company are plentiful food; interesting employment for a proper proportion of the time; proper recrea-

tion, and a first sergeant who will listen to the complaints and requests of the men and not continually find fault. Any deficiency in one or more of these essentials entails a loss of morale through a weakening of one of its principle factors—contentment. If the food is bad there is dissatisfaction; if the first sergeant is irritable or unjust, the men become disgruntled. More damage can be done by an unsatisfactory first sergeant than by any commissioned officer in the organization.

Every company commander should secure a good cook. This cook should be furnished a copy of the "Manual for Army Cooks" and encouraged to study it. There should always be a second cook whose qualifications approach those of the first cook, and who should aspire to continued improvement. The mess sergeant should be very carefully selected and, besides having business ability, should himself be an excellent cook, preferably better than any cook under him. You should have great confidence in your mess sergeant and cooks and should select them so that your confidence is justified. The best way in the world—and about the only satisfactory way—to promote efficiency in the mess hall is to realize the great influence it has on contentment, morale, and consequent efficiency of your company. Through this feeling of its importance there should be aroused an intense and genuine interest in yourself for the mess. "Inspect the mess at each meal" has been taken too indifferently.

The company commander's interest in his men's welfare should demand his presence at all meals whenever it is practicable to attend. An inspection does not mean merely walking through the mess hall; it means an inspection of the mess sergeant's books; a talk with the mess sergeant about everything pertaining to the mess; a few words to the cooks; a close observation for cleanliness and order, and while the men are eating, walking slowly through the mess hall and asking the men here and there how they like the food. Any other visits to the mess hall call for only the last act, with a word or so to the mess sergeant.

The qualifications of a first sergeant are manifold and indefinite. He should be old enough to command respect; he should be able to preserve discipline and at the same time be popular with the men; his popularity should be founded on executive ability and tact in handling men. It is the duty of the first sergeant to keep the men contented by his ability to settle their quarrels and

attend to all minor offenses. The first sergeant should be the caretaker of the men and should promote their contentment through his own ability to handle men. The company clerk should handle all the paper work, with whatever assistance the company commander deems necessary.

If the mess sergeant is worthy of the position he can very plentifully supply the mess with the quality and quantity of food which is satisfactory. He should observe other messes and find out what about them is liked and what is disliked, so that he may profit thereby. Discontent will certainly manifest itself if the men are not satisfied with the management of the mess. Remember, "an army moves on its stomach."

The stomach is the organ through which the body is maintained and nourished. Unless its needs and desires are met, there develops an abnormality of body, the parts of which, including the brain, will not function properly. The writer heard the value of food emphasized very clearly in a talk by Tom Farmer, a reformed member of the James' gang of train robbers. Farmer said, "When I find a man 'in the gutter,' hungry, tired and discontented, I don't start telling him that God will save him, and that he should start praying and placing faith in God. It isn't God that he wants at that time—it's food. So I hit 'im in the belly with a good beefsteak—then he's ready to listen to what I have to say."

"Eight hours for work, eight hours for sleep, eight hours for play" is an old proverb. The eight-hour day is not a new thing. What is needed is some influence that will make men spend their margin of time in recreation or profitable employment.

The old-time conditions which forced men to labor from sunrise to sunset deprived them of the necessary recreation, and curtailed the years of life that could be given to productive labor. Under the present scale of high wages, men are not getting the relaxation demanded if the years from fifty to seventy are to be robust. Too many men induced by the increased pay for extra hours are spending their time in making "overtime." This too great strain on the physical endurance, lowers vitality and produces discontent.

Labor has made great gains through its organizations. Collective bargaining and improved conditions will make splendid opportunities for more healthful living, but labor must learn to take advantage of these opportunities for the conservation of

health, and for utilizing conditions which make for contentment.

A man may be quite fairly judged by what he does with his margin of time. If greed leads him to spend it in extra hours of work, the purpose in providing such margin is nullified. If the time is spent wholly in amusement or diversion, the health of the man will be conserved. But the ideal life has its vocations and its avocations. Not only the physical but the mental side of man should be improved by this margin of time. Reading, writing, some favorite occupation or even hobby, should provide healthful exercise and profitable mental development. Such use of the margin of time a contented life demands. Vocational education has now become an established and integral part of the service and strives to afford the soldier profitable mental recreation when not otherwise employed.

Idleness is the scourge of progress. This is a progressive era. The enlisted man must be furnished profitable recreation. "Leisure is conducive to immorality and dissatisfaction," and we find this particularly true when women and liquor are convenient. The soldier's time is well taken up by military duties until the late afternoon. During holidays and evenings, then, it is our duty to see that the soldier's mind is occupied with helpful thoughts. After a period of physical or mental strain the body desires to be set free—a complete relaxation. In this frame of mind impulse disregards reason, and feeling like a captive wild animal at last set free, the soldier plunges into the most convenient dissipation at hand. The average man's natural tendency is toward immorality, and to live virtuously requires self-control. "Man is prone to evil as the sparks to fly upward." Self-control requires will power. To exert this will power the mind must combat its natural tendency. This requires effort, which is just exactly what the man seeking dissipation does not want. He has an aversion to anything requiring effort, and prefers giving his mind full sway, abandoning all will power and reason.

We are confronted with a difficult task. Upon the approach of a holiday the men's minds should be filled with good thoughts before the improper thoughts can gain a foothold. Men don't generally go on liberty individually; they organize parties of two, three, or four, and make their plans for liberty one or two days ahead. Consequently, we should not wait until the day of liberty before starting in on our morale work. The arrangements once

made by a party are generally carried out. But suppose about a week before liberty day an interesting ball game or other athletic event is announced for the holiday. Then we start our publicity work, urging the attendance of everyone. What is the effect of this? It is twofold, *viz.*, it keeps the men's minds from immoral subjects by filling their minds with thoughts of the big game; also it forestalls the formation of parties for dissipation.

Moving pictures seem to prevail as the most convenient and popular evening entertainment, although weekly vaudeville acts by camp talent are particularly useful as well as amusing. When camp talent is used the men are especially interested, and a large majority will attend who would otherwise go out for a "wild" party.

Although of material assistance, the writer does not believe welfare societies exert a great influence in the prevention of immorality. The great benefit derived from welfare societies is their immense value in promoting contentment and harmony within the camp when there is no liberty. In other words, they exert their power during the week after working hours are over. They do not appreciably prevent men from going to excess on liberty nor promote moral conduct when out of camp. The only way to prevent immorality on liberty is to make camp life so attractive that a minimum number desire to go on liberty.

Nothing can occupy the mind in whole unless it is interesting. Competition is probably the greatest incentive to interest, and hence the enormous value of athletic contests. Interest is paramount to achievement and contentment. Everything the soldier has to do should be so arranged that his interest is aroused and maintained. He should not be assigned any task, the execution of which has no definite aim, for unless he can see that his efforts are useful, no satisfactory results need be expected. Interest is essential to contentment, which involves,

(a) An interest in, and a comprehension of, not only the details, but the result aimed at.

(b) A consideration of the conditions under which the work is done. A proper amount of light and just the right kind of light must be provided. Ventilation and heat, must be provided that the health of the workers may be conserved.

(c) The length of time the work continues, and its variety

or monotony are important factors if that contentment is to be secured which will tend to improve the morale of the body.

Vocational schools have worked a miracle in arousing the men's interest in the studies themselves, and also in their other duties, especially when the latter pertains to the study they pursue. A chauffeur, for instance, who is taking a course in motor mechanics is generally extremely interested in his work, for he can see the practical benefit to be derived from his studies.

Camp newspapers if properly edited are a great aid to contentment and a high morale. The newspaper staff should, however, make a study of what the men want and not confine itself to outside news items. There should be one column for officers; camp society news; arrivals and departures; organization write-ups; athletics and amusements, etc. The names of as many individual men should be mentioned as is practicable. A man whose name is in the paper will not, as a rule, fail to send some of the papers to his friends, and nearly always one goes home.

Music is a wonderful adjunct to contentment. Good music enthruses every one, and if the post has no authorized band or orchestra, one should be organized from volunteers at the post. Glee clubs and other musical attractions also lend a helpful hand.

All life is rhythmical. Some lives seem content though day by day the same routine be followed. With little or no recreation such lives are lived in the same daily groove. Such characters suffer little and enjoy little. Their temperaments are placid. At the other extreme are men like Burns and Poe whose lives are billowy. One moment they rise on the crest of a wave and see far beyond the horizon of average men. Again they sink in the trough, buried in anguish. It is hard for these ill-balanced lives to make themselves content. The more even the rhythm of life, the more content is the rule. The happiest lives are never found in extremes. The happy contented man, the man of greatest use to himself, his family and the world, is the man who possesses the capacity to enjoy life, whose health is conserved, who is interested in his work, and whose avocation brings to him recreation, amusement, and vigor of mind and body.

Materialism would make contentment depend solely on the reaction of physical health. Christian Science and all forms of pure idealism would make contentment a reaction from the perfect

mental condition. But the middle ground realizes that contentment depends on both physical and mental factors.

Of primary importance, let it be acknowledged, is a healthful condition, and it is the duty of the individual and of society to see that every precaution is observed which shall tend to conserve the health of human beings.

On the mental side of prime importance is an abiding and absorbing interest in the work in which one is engaged.

It is not sufficient that a margin of time be provided for recreation, that life may be content. We must go further and endeavor to provide amusement and interests, that this spare time be not wasted, be not spent in breeding discontent.

What has been said applies in a large part generally to the contentment of the mass. Something remains to be said of contentment in the individual.

Under former social conditions, the wage was supposed to answer the question. If the wage was reasonable, if it was value received for service rendered, contentment was supposed to follow. Capital under former conditions has held itself responsible only for a proper return for the service rendered, and even this was not done conscientiously. Labor was regarded as a commodity. If it could be bought cheaply, capital felt it was justified in securing any given service as cheaply as possible from the labor market. Cheap labor was exploited without further consideration, and much of the discontent of to-day is the result of this attitude of capital.

The world has accepted the demand of labor that it shall not be valued so much on the basis of value received, as on the basis of such a return as will support a man and his family in some degree of comfort. We exclude the Chinese because they can underlive the American laborer, and provide a cheap labor.

Society has accepted the demand of labor that the minimum wage be not based on mere existence in squalor but on existence under proper living conditions. The circumstances of the man and his family, the conditions of life under which they live are to-day important social questions. Hygiene has taught us that contagious disease revels among those who by force of circumstances must live in poverty and uncleanness, and that from this prolific source disease communicates itself to all classes of people. Hence it is of vital import that better conditions of life be pro-

vided for the laboring classes. The wage paid must be sufficient to enable life to be lived under hygienic conditions, or else disease will gather here, and invade the homes of those better provided.

We must no longer ignore the ability of the wage earner to live in some degree of comfort. If unable to do this, if faithful, conscientious, regular and efficient labor will not relieve a man of financial trouble then discontent arises, strikes, mutinous conduct, opposition to government gradually gains ground. Radical theorists seize the opportunity to preach Utopian doctrines. Communism, syndicalism, and all forms of Red propaganda are scattered broadcast among laborers wherever they can be found.

In the service we have no capital and labor. We have, of course, the employer and employee. The government is the employer, officers and noncommissioned officers are the superintendents and foremen. The necessities of life are provided. Satisfactory food, clothing, and quarters are attached to the job itself. Wages are determined by military value. The most humble employee can rise to be the most noted director, if he possesses the necessary qualifications. The day of castes is over. Capital no longer exercises its autocratic sway over labor. Humanitarian principles govern capital in its relation to labor just as the same principles find their near-ideal solution in the relationship between officers and men in the service. The employee must always respect the employer and render implicit obedience, or else the organization tumbles. Discipline must continue as the cement which binds together the administrative fabric.

Poverty and ignorance must be banished by education, morality and the consideration taught by the brotherhood of man, and those powerful forces which make for contentment must be the streams that flow into the peaceful progress of civilization.

The old, unjust conditions which capital imposed on labor are being abolished. The autocratic governments of the old world whose tyranny begot anarchy, nihilism, communism and all forms of radicalism have to-day been brought into the bright light of the twentieth century civilization. Heretofore they have festered in the darkness. The World War has routed them out and they stand in the bright light of to-day in all their hideousness. The underlying causes are understood. The conservative and righteous forces of the world are attacking these problems. The serum of an advanced civilization is being injected into the nerves

of backward people. The germ of discontent has been found. American democracy is the curative serum. We need not doubt the efficacy of the remedy.

Confidence in democracy will solve the problem, and under a league of nations the world will continue to advance toward the unrealized possibilities of the human race.

The man, the self, the ego whose contentment makes for high morale, must be actively engaged in promoting the principles of righteous living. Such characters as Pilate are blots on civilization. His life did not properly function. Real character that makes for the highest morale must be an active force fighting against the evil influences tending to deteriorate the social fabric. Contentment with the other fundamental principles of priceless character must be built up from within.

There are times when even the best characters feel despondent, morose, discouraged. It is not these occasional reactions that determine our natures, but the nature as determined by public opinion. Individuals have a happy or gloomy disposition. The soldier is likewise so characterized, and it is our obligation to see that these grouchy dispositions are changed for the better and not aggravated by untactful treatment.

The regularity of the soldier's life tends to rectify the uneven temperament of the grouch type. He rises at six; his blood circulation is quickened and muscles limbered up by a few minutes' physical exercise in the crisp, invigorating morning air; he has a good substantial breakfast, and then prepares for the day's military routine. Everything is standardized and run on schedule.

The company commander sees to it that the drills do not become uninteresting. Different kinds of drills are given so as to relieve the monotony and promote interest. Fifteen minutes in "signals" passes more slowly than a sham battle of half an hour. The nature of the drill and condition of the troops, physically and mentally, determine the time to be devoted to any particular drill.

Donald Hankey, in "A Student in Arms," says that immorality in the average man is counteracted only by,

1. Zest of a quest.
2. Religion.
3. Hero worship.
4. Love of a good woman.

The last is an ever-active force for good conduct. The first is

probably the most practicable in the service. We can apply it by cultivating a special interest in each man for some one thing. The desire to be an expert signalman, expert athlete, or an expert along some vocational line, will often cause a man to spend a large part of his spare time in zest of his quest, and steer him away from immorality and into the channel of personal improvement.

Contentment possibly more than any other factor in morale, calls for an intimate knowledge of human nature. It calls for self-confidence and confidence in others; for initiative and tact, and for a continued study of the needs and desires of your men and the ability to meet these needs and satisfy these desires in a satisfactory manner.

TACTICAL PRINCIPLES—RULES OF COMBAT

BY CAPTAIN G. A. JOHNSON, U.S.M.C.

TACTICS as used in the military sense may be defined as follows:

Tactics is the art of handling troops in the immediate neighborhood of an enemy.

Tactics in this sense embraces for each concrete situation:

a. The steps taken in the Estimate of the Situation, culminating in the decision and orders to carry out same.

b. The actual troop leadership culminating in fire and shock contacts.

Strategem as closely related to tactics may be defined as a system of expedients or more simply the outwitting of the opponent.

Tactics and strategem do not conflict as thus related but, on the contrary, strategem assists tactics.

Tactics and strategem apply equally to small forces or large, a three-man patrol, a battalion or a brigade.

Tactics is governed by certain rules, strategem is not but depends rather on artifice.

The rules which govern tactics are known as *Tactical Principles*. We might better call them Action Principles, Troop Leadership Rules, or, better still, *The Rules of Combat*.

These rules apply equally to defensive and offensive operations.

Good troop leadership in the general tactical sense consists in carrying out the mission with least loss of force.

This is accomplished by applying sound Tactical Principles to concrete cases.

Before one can advance far with the study of tactics, then, and particularly applied tactics, one must first learn these Tactical Principles or Rules of Combat.

As none of the prescribed textbooks for Marine officers list Tactical Principles as such, a compiled paraphrased list is as follows:

TACTICAL PRINCIPLES OR THE RULES OF COMBAT

1. The object of troops in the field is to win battles.
2. Avoid combats that offer no chances of Victory or *Commensurate Results*.
3. To gain Decisive results it is necessary to eventually take the Offensive.
4. Commit sufficient force for the task.
5. Have a simple and definite plan to carry out the mission. Carry it out vigorously. Do not vacillate. Do not attempt complicated manoeuvres.
6. Seize with rapidity strategical and tactical points.
7. Do not hesitate to make a complete change of plan (New Mission) if changes in situation warrant.
8. Concentrate every effort for the Success of the General Plan.
9. Morale—Organization and Supply—Condition of Personnel and Matériel—Advantage of superior weapons—have relative tactical weight in winning battles, and of these morale is the greatest single factor.
10. Safety of Command is *Paramount* and everything except accomplishment of mission must be sacrificed to this end.
11. In presence of enemy tactical considerations over-rule all other factors.
12. Do not hesitate to make *Necessary Sacrifices*.
13. Maintain *Reconnaissance* and *Covering Detachments* at all times no matter how small the force, whether on the march or in bivouac. Leave no part unguarded.
14. Flank protection must be provided by each unit commander down to the smallest.
15. To be surprised is tantamount to *Defeat*.
16. Information has relative tactical value.
17. Get contact with the enemy and keep it *Day and Night*.
18. Report first contact with the enemy.
19. Keep commanders right and left, ahead, and to rear supported by Information.
20. Assume the Enemy will act with Good Judgment.
21. Never do what the enemy wishes if for no other reason than he desires it.

22. Unity of Command is essential to success. A battalion acting as a unit is more powerful than four separate companies.

23. Maintain the *Integrity and Cohesion of Units*. (Best results are obtained when leaders know the capacity and traits of those whom they command.)

24. Avoid *Splitting* the Command when danger of defeat in detail.

25. Spare the Command all unnecessary hardship.

26. Work the command to its utmost limit when necessity arises.

27. Provide proper Depth of Deployment, hold out a support, reserve and Assault Troops, and avoid undue haste in committing these to action.

28. Assault troops should be held intact—Replacements are furnished by supports and reserves.

29. Avoid losses by the use of cover.

30. Avoid losses by proper use of *Approach, Attack, and Assault* formations.

31. Avoid premature deployment (wrong lines).

32. Avoid undue extension and dispersion.

33. Do not feed the firing line in *Dribblets*.

34. *Gain* and Maintain Fire Superiority.

35. To retreat in *Daylight* after being stopped by fire is suicidal.

36. Pursue a beaten enemy till he is destroyed or consolidate against his counter-attack.

37. The best way to meet an unexpected flank attack or enfilading fire is by using the support.

38. Delegate authority to Subordinates commensurate with their capabilities.

39. As a Subordinate, act as the Commander would if *Present*. (Teamwork—Unity of Command—Assistance to adjoining units.) Subordinates must not allow this independence to become license.

40. Battle posts of supreme commander and subordinate commanders, prior to and during combat, and in the assault must be maintained.

41. Night manœuvres are more Difficult and are Different from the same manœuvres in Daylight.

42. All commanders from the company up are responsible for the battle supplies.

43. In a given situation it is far better to do any intelligent

thing consistent with the aggressive execution of the general plan, than to search hesitatingly for the ideal.

Knowing the rules of a game is only the necessary preliminary.

Thorough understanding and expertness in their application to that degree where the estimate of the situation is automatically instantaneous, in active troop leadership on the field of battle is necessary. This may only be acquired by constant study of the Drill Regulations, Field Service Regulations, Current Lectures, etc., prior campaigns and history, together with the working out of map problems, tactical walks or rides, tactical exercises and fire problems and manœuvre with troops in the field under assumed situations.

Without discussing any one of the rules as herein given certain facts that apply in general to all Tactical Principles merit a word of explanation.

Briefly these are:

(a) That each arm, infantry, cavalry, artillery, machine guns, etc., has certain powers and limitations, and therefore has certain tactics peculiar to its particular functioning, and that as infantry officers some knowledge of these tactics is necessary in order to provide teamwork in action and to circumvent movements of the enemy's auxiliary arms tactically.

(b) All things being equal, artillery fights artillery, infantry fights infantry, etc.

(c) That certain of the Tactical Principles are rigid, laws rather than rules, that allow of no discretion, while others are flexible and permit of interpretations for each particular concrete case.

(d) That in irregular operations the employment of sound tactical principles augments powerfully the peculiar tactics employed to meet the requirements of minor irregular warfare. (In this connection as being of particular importance to Marine Corps tactics on Southern Expeditionary duty, see pars. 596 to 603, incl., I.D.R., 1911.)

(e) That the 43 Tactical Principles as listed in this article were in existence as such prior to the World War, are old and well proved; that the World War has not changed these rules, that the utilization of new weapons (accompanying weapons for infantry) resulted in the adoption of new methods and ways of applying old Tactical Principles, this principally in the economy of manpower, fewer losses.

A DISCUSSION OF THE SALUTE

BY MAJOR J. D. MURRAY, U.S.M.C.

THE Old Order Changeth—crowns totter and fall—the last absolute monarchy, Russia, falls, and like France in its revolution moves through a sea of blood and a reaction which seems for the moment worse than czardom, toward the Light—as, on a smaller scale does Mexico. China becomes a republic with startling suddenness, and though somewhat unsteady in its infancy, progresses along the hard road of Evolution towards the new Heights. Perhaps the next centre of civilization may be in Russia and China—such vastness have they—such potential unorganized strength and deep wisdom—when the dross of ignorance shall be drawn off in the smelting of Time.

A strange preamble perhaps, considering the subject, but Custom is strong in small things as well as great, and attempts to resist the radical dreams of to-day, which more often than not become the practical facts of to-morrow.

A few years ago many of us would have called any one in the service a raw red radical, or something even less delicate, who suggested abolition of full dress, swords, sashes, brightwork, captains' gigs, grog, double irons, bread and water, and many other time-honored (?) trimmings, but, The Old Order Changeth, and the fateful wheels of Evolution move on. Often we cry out, but still they move, our cries die away and are not echoed by the succeeding generation, except when they, reading books which give a romantic color to the harsh things or else omit them altogether, sigh of "The Good Old Days," when such things as religious intolerance, murders, executions, ignorance, and wars without anæsthetics were the order of the day. To be sure, we have more neurasthenia, money-madness, divorces, cigarettes, and lingerie advertisements—and sometimes it seems as if the "men were getting softer and the women harder," to the cynics and the "mentally dyspeptic"—but we do move forward as a world even though by nations and races we sometimes drop back a file or two for a while.

Then may I not hope for immunity from suspicion of Bolshevik leanings (at least on the part of open-minded folk), if I discuss (I'll not say suggest!) the abolition of the salute, except on occasions of ceremony? When I served in the ranks, my attitude towards the salute was that I was proud to salute an officer whom I admired, and saluted any whom I did not with particular punctilio and precision, as much as to say to the one, "A fine soldier and a gentleman you are, sir, and I'm proud to follow your leadership," and, to the other, "Here's to what you're supposed to be!"

Let me take the affirmative by quoting (not verbatim) the officers, enlisted men, civilians—"old timers" and youngsters—serious and flippant with whom I've discussed the idea; by citing incidents; and, with your indulgence, by stating a few private opinions; and then I'll take up the negative side (since this is a discussion).

"The abolition of the salute would be destructive of discipline: . . ." "The Bolsheviks abolished the salute, and now look at 'em! . . ." "The salute is simply a sign of recognition between military men; . . ." "A fraternal signal; . . ." "An acknowledgment of the oath of obedience to constituted authority; . . ." "The best saluters are the best fighters; . . ." "The enlisted man should salute an officer, since he can become one himself and would expect to be saluted, . . ." and so on, *ad infinitum*.

On the other hand, saluting is not required in the line in time of war. It would draw fire, and there are more important things to think of and do—yet does discipline go to pieces?

"All Men Are Created Free and Equal," said our new message to the world. Our "peasantry" did not and do not touch the forelock to the "gentry," because we decided that one class was enough, and anyway, no one would agree to be "peasantry"! How many American servants does one see? Many would be better off as far as creature comforts go if they did become servants, but they do not wish to salaam to anyone. In the Old World political equality is claimed and admitted, but Custom is strong, and social inferiority is admitted by touching the cap, or other obsequious gesture. Can you safely say to an American, "My good man"; "My worthy fellow"; and, in current parlance, "get away with it?"

Perhaps as a nation we are too hustling to pay proper attention to polite forms, which formerly were the outward signs of culture and breeding and are inclined to scoff at those who do, but I am simply discussing what I believe to be facts. I personally rather like the salute, because (terrible confession for an American!) I have an old-fashioned streak of sentiment, and a liking for the dramatic when not overdone. (Which is outside the point.)

The American *does not* like the salute—out of ranks—in public. *Voila!* Say what you will, cite individual instances to the contrary, appeal to *Esprit de Corps*, intelligence, loyalty, soldierly instinct, or tradition all you please; all but the thinning lines of the Old Guard will say (to themselves if not to you) that the salute came hard at first and irks them still.

Americans are proud to be called practical and hate to be "theatrical." Let them form military societies and they'll voluntarily salute their heads off, and bestow titles upon each other to the *n*th degree, but that's play. If the "Supreme Ruler" tried for a moment to really be supreme, they'd "tell him where to get off," but as it is they like to heap on the emoluments, salutes, and ceremony due the elected Topside Potentate, knowing that next year, or eventually, they'll be chosen to wield the baton or wear the feathers, so they let him sit on the throne the third Thursday in each month, until the annual meeting in October.

We're queer that way, many of us, and our children, too, like to play their similar kid games (though they haven't learned to mix politics in them!). Maybe if we dislike the Grand Poobah of our uniformed society, we'll resign, or at least won't attend meetings during his term of office, unless he's away on a business trip, and Bill, the Senior Vice Infallible Gazumpus (whom we like) occupies the plush throne.

We poor soldiers, however, *have* to play our game seriously, for the neighbors still need us occasionally, just as they do Chemical 6, or Engine 1, and, "Once in Awhile We *Have* Finished in Style" (and will again, we hope, if necessary), so we try each year to become more business-like and efficient at scientific defense and offense.

Psychology (*I must* use the word—can't think of a synonym!) has always played a large part in our profession, so we realize that we still must have bands, parades, fireworks, formal guard mounts, medals, and decorations to thrill us. Maybe some day

we'll outgrow them (and by that time may have outgrown scrapping, *Quien Sabe?*)—but if we suddenly stopped them all right now, the civilians would say, "What are we paying you for?—We want some of the thrills, too!"—and then we'd be Strictly Out of Luck! (It's a funny world, isn't it?)

The French salute spontaneously. I don't know what their regulations on the subject may be, but one doesn't see an officer or a soldier walking along the Rue du Vin Rouge with his right hand moving up and down mechanically in time with his legs, giving and returning salutes, yet watch him salute the colors of a passing regiment, a funeral, or some ally who has just fought well!

The "Marseillaise" is not dutifully played at daily band concerts—probably if the French soldier were to hear it played that way he'd not pay any particular attention to it—yet watch him leap to his feet, in rigid attitude, head upraised and hand at salute instinctively—his expression, perhaps stolid a moment before, with the soul of "La Patrie" in his eyes—if a band spontaneously bursts out with it upon the appearance of Marshal Foch, or a group of grimy wounded "poilus."

A certain fine old admiral issued an order during the war to all officers of his district that they were to reprimand each enlisted man and report each officer failing to salute. This order, it was stated, did not apply to the Marines, "whose saluting was excellent." (Probably it was, *then!*) A Marine officer attached to that district told the admiral within a few days that it was impracticable and almost impossible to carry out the order, since it involved stopping so many that he could never get anywhere on time, and on the public streets a crowd invariably gathered who often became hostile and threatened to mob him, for to them it was a gratuitous attempt to humiliate the man!

The average officer, I fully believe, looks at an enlisted man as he passes lest he fail to recognize the salute, and the average enlisted man thinks the officer is looking at him to make sure that he doesn't fail to salute.

Watch the trouble people go to to avoid saluting; evincing sudden interest in the second story windows of a building across the way, a dog, or an automobile, or talking earnestly with someone. Notice the stage business if they start to salute and suddenly think that their salute is not going to be recognized, or that

the salutee is not an officer. Imaginary nose-wipes, cap-straightenings, mustache-pullings, etc., demand much more effort than does the salute, but how often one can see them resorted to!

I have stopped men on the street when their failure to salute was particularly flagrant and said, "You're a Marine, supposedly the last word in soldierliness, aren't you? Do you realize that you have just been unsoldierly to the extent of having deliberately disobeyed an order of the Navy Department, which requires us all to salute? Perhaps a half dozen people noticed us just now, and probably said, 'Huh! I always heard how snappy the Marines were. Guess that's all bunk, or else that feller's only a rookie!' Don't you see the way it is?"

The answer almost invariably would be, "I didn't recognize you, sir," often said with such well-simulated respectful indignation that the sayer probably almost fooled himself into thinking it true. The fact is that he took a chance and didn't get away with it, *because he does not like to salute!*

"It's the fault of the officers," I hear a chorus say; "many of them are too free-and-easy and don't insist on the salute." True, partly at least, but why? Because they dislike to publicly reprimand a man for not saluting as they would for sloppiness in uniform or equipment, insubordination, or flagrant neglect of duty, and they realize that *forcing* a man to assume a respectful attitude and make a respectful gesture, is a sham.

An officer said to me at a post where I'd just reported and therefore didn't know my way about, "Let's go around these buildings; it's a little longer, but we won't have so much saluting to do." Later in the day I overheard one enlisted man say to another (and neither was a recruit) the very same thing, in almost identically the same words!

In case the entire abolition of the salute be considered too radical a step, salutes could be ordered for the colors, general and flag officers, when making or receiving reports, and at ceremonies.

Some drill book had it that the command or signal for the charge should be made at the moment that the troops were going to charge anyway! The idea about the salute is psychologically the same, it seems to me, for while I have been simply stating as my own opinion that Americans don't like to be compelled to salute, we all know that there is more violation of the saluting order than ever before, and a great tendency to "Let George do

it," when it comes to personally correcting individual violations.

This has not been destructive criticism, and one of the principal functions of our GAZETTE should be to serve as an open forum where we can freely discuss everything from Belleau Wood to "Boats, gravy."

If we should come to think that the foregoing, or any other radical change which may ever be put into effect is proving at all subversive of discipline, all we need to do is to have a good big parade, and when the Marine Band breaks into "Semper Fidelis" as we swing past in review, I'll leave it to anyone if we won't all blithely march through Hell again if necessary, with the old spirit which is Discipline itself—"and then some!"

MARINE CORPS ARTILLERY

BY CAPTAIN P. A. DEL VALLE, U.S.M.C.

IT has been argued, and not without reason, that the Marines are infantry and that the acquisition of artillery of any sort by the Corps will result in a loss of mobility; that should artillery be required it would be furnished by the Army; that it will materially impair our efficiency as infantry to have among us certain organizations designated as artillery. There are more arguments against the artillery than the ones set forth above, and many of the officers aligned with the opposition could doubtless furnish much more weighty ones than these. But, granting that artillery in the Corps brings with its advantages certain disadvantages, I wish to set forth some of the reasons which seem to me sufficient to warrant its existence and at the same time show that Marine Corps Artillery is not a new departure, but is a growth resulting from experience.

In the first place artillery is a life-saver. It saves the infantry. Where, without artillery, you would have to throw in one thousand men, three hundred could do the job with the help of a battery. Result: saving in lives, saving in number of men to be transported to the scene of action with their baggage and subsistence. The extra weight carried for artillery purposes is practically compensated for. The artillery transportation facilities are placed at the scene of action at the disposal of the infantry to aid, not to hinder, their mobility. Everybody who served with the Jeffery Quads the artillery had in Haiti, and later in Santo Domingo, will remember them gratefully, in spite of their disadvantages. Those who were present at the capture of Santo Domingo City will remember the difficulties under which the 9th Company guns and their ammunition were landed, but they will also remember that the threatened power of that battery caused the rebels to use so much discretion that we accomplished our object quite bloodlessly; the city was taken without firing a shot. Can there be any better example of life-saving than that?

In the second place, Marine Corps artillery is, and should always be, trained and kept trained as infantry. We are Marines first and always. Whatever knowledge we may acquire over and above that which we should always be equipped with as Marines, can do us no harm professionally. It should, on the contrary, help us, as infantry, to appreciate and understand the other branches with which we may at any time be called upon to co-operate. As the other branches exist only as auxiliaries to the infantry, the infantry commander should have a good working knowledge of them in order to apply them to advantage. Therefore, an officer or enlisted man who has had artillery experience should make a better, not a worse, infantryman for having gone through the experiences and problems of an artilleryman. I have never heard of a case where Marines serving as artillery and used as infantry when the occasion demanded, failed to handle themselves creditably. The artillery training has never yet impaired our usefulness as infantry. Can it be argued, then, that it makes for inefficiency?

In the third place, if any of the jobs assigned to the Marine Corps in any way require artillery and we have none of our own, but must depend on the Army, what would be the result? The Marine Corps dependent upon another branch of the service for fulfilling its purposes. Half the reason for our existence gone. An expedition waiting to get off until the Army can manage to place at our disposal at the place required such artillery as they can spare. The presence among us of an organization which knows little of the sea and the ways of the Navy, unavoidable friction until they can learn our ways and be assimilated. Danger of the Army taking command in situations where our own officers are preëminently fitted by training and experience to command. There is to be considered in this connection also the fact that a situation requiring Marines, such as landing on foreign territory without a declaration of war, would necessarily preclude the use of Army troops.

In the fourth place, are Marines, because they are infantry, forbidden to handle a ship's guns? Yet there is nothing less connected with infantry than naval gunnery. And all these years Marines have been naval gunners without losing a whit of their infantry usefulness. Why argue, then, against artillery in the Marine Corps when for years we have successfully handled guns

and come through fit as ever for an infantry job? We have handled landing guns and field batteries since time immemorial. Our men have not forgotten they were infantry in spite of it. Can the mere fact of designating certain organizations as artillery in the Marine Corps cause such violent changes for the worse, then? The calls for independent action on our part are too numerous and the experiences we have had too convincing to leave any doubt as to the wisdom of artillery of our own, properly trained and equipped to handle our batteries, yet first, last and always ready for use as infantry, our first and most important function.

OTHER MARINES

By COLONEL GEORGE C. THORPE, U.S.M.C.

SECOND lieutenants are told that the origin of American Marines was the nucleus of the American Navy, accomplished through the process of placing soldiers on merchant vessels which thereby became men-o'-war. It is generally understood that the Americans duplicated what happened in England in 1664 when the "Admiral's regiment," composed of "twelve hundred land souldgers to be forthwith rayzed to be in readiness to be distributed in His Majesty's fleete prepared for sea service" made the foundation of the first organized and disciplined English sea service for war.

While these two organizations (the British and the American) are the only marine forces to survive as sea soldiers, they certainly were not the first marine infantry known to military history.

In the greatest sea battle recorded, in point of numbers of ships and men engaged—the Battle of Ecnomus between Rome and Carthage—the organization and action were peculiarly marine on the part of the victors.

In the third century before the Christian Era Rome was trying to consolidate the Italian peninsula and the Roman legion was the instrument. At the same time the Tryean colony at Carthage was an ambitious rival for the profitable trade with northern barbarians. Carthaginian power naturally rested in naval strength since it was maritime emprise that had brought the Tyrean merchants so far west in the Mediterranean. Maps of the period show how the Carthaginian boundaries were extending to include Mediterranean islands south of Italy and how the Carthaginians had already conquered most of Spain. The Roman Senate suddenly realized the significance of naval power and as promptly resolved upon the immediate creation of a fleet that could compete with that of Carthage. With characteristic energy the Roman government quickly converted forests into ships large enough to accommodate crews of more than four hundred men. While this construction was going on, men were taught rowing by exercising them on benches erected on the sand beach. But

the Romans were wise enough to recognize that new ships manned by raw recruits who were strangers to the "sea habit" would not constitute a navy that could cope with the seasoned fleet of their opponents whose crews had spent their lives afloat. But, believing in the vast superiority of the legionary over every other kind of fighting man, Roman strategists sought a solution of the difficult problem that confronted them wherein the legionary would be an element. They estimated that their only hope lay in bringing the legionary to bear upon the Carthaginian sailor.

The solution was made possible by the naval constructor who invented the *corvus* (crow) which consisted of an additional mast stepped on the forecastle with a gangway, or bridge, pivoted on it so that it could be swung quickly to either side or over the bow, *i.e.*, could be moved in a horizontal arc of about one hundred and eighty degrees. The outer end of the gangway was rigged with a heavy, sharp prong or pike, like a crow's bill (hence the name *corvus*), which served to grapple and hold to the deck of an adversary's ship when the bridge was dropped upon it. Thus, the plan was, as soon as Roman ships could make physical contact with the Carthaginians, each Roman vessel should drop its *corvus* upon an adversary ship which would permit the legionaries to rush across the bridge and make short work of dispatching the Carthaginian "flat foot."

On the day of battle off Sicily, in 256 B.C., three hundred and thirty Roman ships were attacked by three hundred and fifty Carthaginian. As the average crew of the Carthaginian vessel was about four hundred men, and as the Romans had placed on their new ships one hundred and twenty marines in addition to three hundred rowers, there were nearly three hundred thousand men in action in this lively sea fight.

The Roman estimate proved correct: the legionary turned marine was irresistible. The Carthaginian sailors had expected to win the day by reason of their superiority in ship handling and superiority of numbers, but when the developments of the day denied them the employment of naval tactics and brought them into hand-to-hand combat with the Roman marines, they were almost helpless.

The Carthaginian fleet was badly shattered and command of the sea was lost; the way was laid open for the invasion of

Africa. From the day that Roman marines in the battle of Ecnomus saved Italy, the greatness of Carthage began to dwindle.

That the Romans appreciated the value of the amphibious army and continued an organization of marine infantry is attested by Rodolfo Lauciani in an interesting volume entitled "Ancient Rome in Light of Recent Excavations" in discussing the system employed by the ancients in boring and tunnelling mountains for hydraulic purposes. He says that in 1866 a marble altar was discovered near Lambæse, upon which a report was engraved, beginning with a petition from Varius Clemens, governor of Mauritania, to Valerius Etruscas, governor of Numidia, in 152 A.D. It refers to the perforation of a tunnel to bring down to Saldæ or Civitas Salditana (now Bougie, Algeria) the waters of a spring fourteen miles distant. The petition says:

"Varius Clemens greets Valerius Etruscas and begs him in his own name and in the name of the township of Saldæ to dispatch at once the hydraulic engineer of the III^d legion, Nonius Datus, with orders that he finish the work which he seems to have forgotten."

It seems that the engineer was sent and when he had finished his labors in connection with the tunnel he wrote the magistrate of Saldæ:

"After leaving my quarters I met with brigands on my way who robbed me even of my clothes, and wounded me severely. I succeeded, after the encounter, in reaching Saldæ where I was met by the governor who, after allowing me some rest, took me to the tunnel. There I found everybody sad and despondent; they had given up all hopes that the two opposite sections of the tunnel would meet, because each section had already been excavated beyond the middle of the mountain, and the junction had not yet been effected. As always happens in these cases, the fault was attributed to the engineer, as though he had not taken all precautions to insure the success of the work. What could I have done better? I began by surveying and taking the levels of the mountain; I marked most carefully the axis of the tunnel across the ridge; I drew plans and sections of the whole work; which plans I handed over to Petronius Celer, the governor of Mauretania; and to take extra precaution I summoned the contractor and his workmen and began the excavation in their presence, *with the help of two gangs of experi-*

enced veterans, namely, a detachment of marine infantry and a detachment of Alpine troops. What more could I have done?"

The tunnel was satisfactorily completed. Thus in 152 A.D. we find the Roman marine, like the American of 1920, able to do any sort of job.

It would be interesting to have a list of the variety of employments that have engaged the marine of various nationalities. He has fought in every corner of the world in every military or naval enterprise of the last two and a half centuries of English history, and has taken an important part in every feature of American military history. But that statement by no means tells the story of his valuable service or of his qualifications for service. For example, Marchesa Vitelleschi in "A Court in Exile," tells of the employment of a hundred marines in bringing the pretender Charles Edward (son of James III and Clementina Sobreski) to the British Isles to lead his adherents to battle for his throne. In Corbett's "Drake and the Tudor Navy" there is a great deal of typically marine infantry combat. One of special interest is that of the landing in 1585 or 1586 west of Santo Domingo City to take that place very much the same as was done by American marines in 1916, with the difference that, while the Dominicans fled in the latter case, the Spaniards resisted with infantry, cavalry, artillery, and by driving a herd of long-horned cattle upon the attacking British marines.

THE CAPTURE OF NEW ORLEANS

BY MAJOR EDWIN NORTH McCLELLAN, U.S.M.C.

PASSING THE FORTS

ON April 16, 1862, a Federal Fleet under command of David Glasgow Farragut, Flag Officer, Western Gulf Blockading Squadron, crossed the bar at the mouth of the Mississippi River and bombarded Forts Jackson and St. Philip for five days. Farragut's memorable passage of the forts commenced on April 24, 1862, his report, dated April 25, 1862, to the Secretary of the Navy reading in part as follows:

"I have the honor to inform the Department that on the 24th instant, at about half-past 3.00 a.m., I attacked Fort St. Philip and Fort Jackson with my little fleet, while Commander Porter most gallantly bombarded them, and besides took them in the flank with his steamers, aided by the *Portsmouth*. * * * I then pushed up for the city of New Orleans. * * * We drove them from their guns and passed up to the city in fine style, and I now send this notice of our having taken possession of the city at meridian or a few minutes p.m."

Under date of April 29, 1862, Farragut reported to the Secretary of the Navy: "I am happy to announce to you that our flag waves over both Forts Jackson and St. Philip, and at New Orleans over the Custom House."

The following vessels were engaged in the attack upon the two forts: *Hartford*, *Brooklyn*, *Richmond*, *Pensacola*, *Portsmouth*, *Mississippi*, *Oneida*, *Varuna*, *Katahdin*, *Kineo*, *Wissahickon*, *Cayuga*, *Iroquois*, *Kennebec*, *Pinola*, *Itasca*, and *Winona*.

COMMANDING OFFICERS COMMENDED MARINES

Commendatory statements were made by practically all of the officers commanding the ships regarding the conduct of the Marines.

After the fleet was fairly past the forts several Confederate gunboats were still making resistance and two of them attacked the *Varuna*, which vessel, by her greater speed, was in advance of her consorts; they ran into her and caused her to sink, but not before she had destroyed her adversaries; and when the *Hartford* passed, the wrecks of the three vessels were lying side by side.

The Marine Guard of the *Varuna* was commanded by a noncommissioned officer, and that it behaved in an admirable manner is shown by the following report of the Commanding Officer of the *Varuna*, Commander Charles S. Boggs:

"The Marines, although new recruits, more than maintained the reputation of that Corps. Their galling fire cleared the *Morgan's* rifled gun and prevented a repetition of her murderous fire. Four of the Marines were wounded, one, I fear, mortally."

The *Varuna's* Marine Guard was transferred to the *Brooklyn* and then to the *Hartford*, as is shown by the following extract from the Log of the *Hartford* under date of April 30, 1862:

"At 3.00 p.m. a sergeant, a corporal, and seven privates came on board from the *Brooklyn*, originally belonging to the *Varuna*."

Commander John De Camp, commanding the *Iroquois*, reported in part: "The greatest praise I can bestow upon the officers of the *Iroquois* is to say that they all did their duty, and each of them always expressed his determination to conquer. The crew and Marines behaved with spirit and gallantry, which we may always expect in well-drilled Americans."

"Our loss in killed and wounded, I am sorry to say, is large. One Master's Mate, five Seamen, and two Marines are killed and twenty-four wounded. * * *."

The Commanding Officer of the *Brooklyn*, Captain Thomas T. Craven, reported in part: "Lieutenant James Forney, commanding the Marines, had two guns assigned him, and with his men fought most gallantly."

MARINES LAND AND OCCUPY PARTS OF NEW ORLEANS

On April 24, 1862, immediately after the action with Forts Jackson and St. Philip, Marines under command of Captain John L. Broome, of the Marines, landed by order of Farragut, and took possession of the Quarantine, hoisting the American flag over the same. Flag Officer Farragut, in reporting under date of April 25, 1862, to the Secretary of the Navy, made the following statement: "At 10.00 I sent on shore again and ordered Lieutenants Kautz of the Navy, and Broome, of the Marines, with a Marine Guard, to hoist the flag on the Custom House, but the excitement of the crowd was so great that the Mayor and Councilmen thought it would produce a conflict and great loss of life."

In his report, dated May 6, 1862, to the Navy Department,

Farragut included the following: "I sent on shore and hoisted the American flag on the Custom House and hauled down the Louisiana State flag from the City Hall, as the Mayor had avowed that there was no man in New Orleans who dared to haul it down, and my own convictions are that if such an individual could have been found, he would have been assassinated."

Flag Officer Farragut had preceded the hauling down of the above-mentioned flag with considerable correspondence with the Mayor of New Orleans (John T. Monroe), including the following letter addressed to the Mayor on April 29, 1862:

"The forts, St. Philip and Jackson, having surrendered, and all the military defenses of the city being captured or abandoned, you are required as the sole representative of any supposed authority in the city to haul down and suppress every ensign and symbol of government, whether State or Confederate, except that of the United States. I am now about to raise the flag of the United States upon the Custom House, and you will see that it is respected with all the civil power of the city."

On April 25, 1862, a detachment of thirty Marines from the *Pensacola*, under Lieutenant J. C. Harris, U. S. Marine Corps, disembarked. The levee at New Orleans was at that time crowded with a multitude of highly excited men and women, largely composed of the worst element of a notoriously turbulent population, who greeted the Marines with cries of execration and derision; knives and pistols were freely brandished in their faces, but, undaunted by all these hostile demonstrations the Marines calmly but promptly formed and marched to their destination. Arriving at the United States Mint, a cordon of sentinels was placed around the building, the Confederate flag lowered and replaced by that of the United States. This having been accomplished, the detachment under Lieutenant Harris, remained in possession until the arrival of the battalion under Captain Broome, when it was consolidated with it.

The private diary of Commander H. H. Bell, under date of April 29, 1862, reads as follows: "11.00 a.m. I went ashore with all the Marines of the Fleet and two pieces of artillery to hoist the flag of the United States over the Custom House and haul down the flag of the State of Louisiana which flaunted over the City Hall. I proceeded to the Custom House, entering through the Post Office door, which is in the southwest corner of the build-

ing, and, placing Lieutenant Ramsay, with a guard of twenty Marines, in charge of the entire building and the flag to be hoisted there, I ascended to the top of the building, accompanied by Lieutenant Kautz, Lieutenant Ramsay, Boatswain's Mate George Russell, and four Marines from the *Richmond*, and (11.30) hoisted the flag of the United States over the south face of the building, attaching it to a pole about fifteen feet long, the flagstaff having been cut down."

An extract from the Journal of the *Richmond*, dated April 29, 1862, reads as follows: "The United States flag floats over the city to-day. At 10 a.m. the Marine Guards of the *Hartford*, *Richmond*, *Pensacola*, and *Brooklyn*, with two field pieces, were landed in the city under the command of the Captain of Marines of the flagship. Thousands of the people came down to the levee to see the Yankees, as they called us. After everything was got ready, we marched up in the city to the Custom House, where an immense mob had gathered. The Marine Guard of the *Richmond* took charge of the building, while the battalion of Marines and the two field pieces, manned by the Sailors, drew up in line in front of the building to prevent the mob from making any resistance. At 11.30 a.m. the Stars and Stripes fluttered in the breeze over the building amidst shouts and jeers from the mob. The *Richmond's* guard was left to protect it, when the battalion marched up to the City Hall, where the rebels had their State flag hoisted. The field pieces were brought up and placed in front of the building, while the battalion of Marines was drawn up in line in the square in front of the city hall. The crowd had increased to thousands, and it was as much as we could do to keep them back. After having got everything ready, the captain of the flagship took a file of Marines and a few Sailors and went up into the hall and took down the Rebel flag. After having completed our business, we were marched down to the levee, where we embarked. We arrived on our ship at 1.30 p.m. The *Richmond's* Marine Guard will guard the flag on the Custom House until General Butler's troops can get here to take possession of the city. All day, after the battalion of Marines left the city, the mob gathered around the Custom House, where our gallant little party was stationed. They swore they would wreak their vengeance upon us, and it was as much as our little band could do to keep the mob out of the building. At sundown, when the

ships hauled down their colors, we hauled down ours, and then we came out of the building and marched down to the landing, where the boat was in waiting to receive us. It was as much as we could do to force our way through the crowd without using violence. We at last gained the boat, when we were taken aboard of our ship."

An abstract from the Log of the *Hartford*, dated April 29, 1862, reads as follows: "At 6.30 a.m. Captain Bailey brought word up from below that both forts had surrendered; the Stars and Stripes were waving over them. At 7.30 General Butler left to go down the river. At 11 a.m. sent the Marine Guard on shore with Captain Bell, Lieutenant Kautz, U. S. Navy, and Captain Broome, U. S. Marine Corps, to hoist the American flag and haul down the State flag. At 11.15 sent the two howitzers ashore in charge of Midshipmen Read and Hazeltine. At 11.30 a.m. dropped down abreast of the City Hall; all Marines of the squadron were landed. At 11.50 the American flag was hoisted over the new Custom House. Meridian to 4 p.m. The Marines returned on board, also the howitzers and crews. Released prisoners on their taking the oath of allegiance."

Lieutenant Albert Kautz, U. S. Navy, gives an account of incidents occurring about this time in these words:

"Farragut determined to make a formal demand for the surrender on Mayor Monroe, and at 10 o'clock on the morning of the 26th he sent me ashore. * * * My little force on leaving the *Hartford* consisted of Midshipman John H. Read and a Marine Guard of twenty men under command of Second Lieutenant George Heisler [who died June 12, 1862]. We landed on the levee in front of a howling mob. * * * It was expected that I would take the Marines with me to the City Hall as a bodyguard * * *. The Marines were drawn up in line, and I attempted to reason with the mob, but soon found this impossible. I then thought to clear the way by bringing the Marines to an aim, but women and children were shoved to the front, while the angry mob behind them shouted: 'Shoot, you — Yankees, shoot!' * * * An officer of the City Guard * * * begged me to leave the Marines on the levee. * * * I sent the Marine Guard back to the ship, retaining only one noncommissioned officer, with a musket."

On April 29, 1862, a battalion of Marines, two hundred and

fifty strong, under Captain John L. Broome, landed and marched to the Custom House. Captain Alan Ramsay of the Marines, was detailed with a detachment of Marines to occupy the Custom House and guard the United States flag. Lieutenant Kautz states: "We landed at the foot of Canal Street and proceeded to a position in front of the Custom House, where the Marines were drawn up in line, with loaded pieces, * * * 'the Stars and Stripes rose into the sky and swelled on the breeze.' * * * A guard with the Lieutenant of Marines was left in charge of the flag at the Custom House."

The battalion then marched to the City Hall, a distance of about half a mile from the vessels of the fleet, and near the centre of the city. The squares and streets were thronged with an excited mob, brandishing bowie-knives and revolvers, and hailing the Marines with the most abusive language; but the command marched in close order and steady steps to its destination. On arriving at the City Hall, Lieutenant John C. Harris was directed, with a guard of Marines, to occupy the building and enforce order there while the enemy's flag was hauled down from the flagstaff on the building. After performing this duty, the Marines were marched to the place of embarkation, and returned to the fleet, except the number quartered in the Custom House, who were retained there for the purpose of guarding the United States flag. When the troops of General Butler's command landed at New Orleans, on the 1st of May, the force of Marines still on duty in the city returned to the fleet.

An abstract from the Log of the *Pensacola* under date of May 1, 1862, is as follows:

"Sent 20 Marines in charge of Lieutenant Harris to guard the American flag on shore."

REPORT OF CAPTAIN BROOME

The following excellent report rendered by "John L. Broome, Capt. Command'g Marines Gulf Squadron," on November 17, 1862, to "Col. John Harris, Commandant, U. S. Marine Corps, Headquarters, Washington City," gives a digested account of these operations:

"Under the impression that a report had been made of the part taken by the United States Marines of the Fleet, under the command of Admiral Farragut, in the military operations, on shore,

in the approach to, and at New Orleans, in April last, I made no report to the Col. Commandant of the Marine Corps, at that time.

"I take occasion to correct the omission, and report the following:

"On the morning of the 24th April last, and immediately after the action with Forts Jackson and St. Philip, and the destruction of the Rebel Fleet, the Marines under my command, by order of Admiral Farragut, landed and took possession of the Quarantine, at the same time taking prisoners the Rebel troops, with their officers, quartered in the Quarantine Buildings, and hoisting the Flag of the United States on the same.

"Admiral Farragut having determined to take military possession of the City of New Orleans, until the arrival of the troops of the U. S. Army under General Butler's command, a battalion of United States Marines, under my command, about two hundred and fifty strong, were disembarked from the Fleet, on the 29th of April last, and marched to the Custom House, where I detailed Captain Alan Ramsay, with a detachment of Marines, to occupy the Custom House, and guard the United States Flag, then about to be hoisted on the building.

"At this juncture the Marines were joined by two howitzers, manned by seamen in charge of Midshipmen T. H. Read, and E. C. Hazeltine, from the Flag Ship *Hartford*. After occupying the Custom House, I received orders from Commodore H. H. Bell, Senior Officer Present, to march the Marines, to the City Hall, a distance of about half a mile from the vessels of our Fleet, and near the centre of the city.

"On arriving at the City Hall, I directed Lieut. John C. Harris, with a guard of Marines, to occupy the building, and enforce order there, while the Rebel Flag was being hauled down, from the flagstaff on the City Hall.

"After performing this duty, the Marines were marched to the place of embarkation, and returned to the Fleet, except the Marines quartered in the Custom House, who were retained there, for the purpose of guarding the United States Flag.

"When the troops of General Butler's command landed at New Orleans on the first of May last, the force of Marines, on duty in the city, returned to the Fleet."

First Lieutenant James Forney, commanding the Marine Guard of the *Brooklyn*, made the following report, dated April 26, 1862, to his Commanding Officer:

"Sir: In obedience to your order, I submit the following:

"There not being any use for my Marines with their muskets, I volunteered to Mr. Lowry, the Executive Officer of the ship, to allow me two guns during the action. I had abundance of time to drill them, so that when the engagement came off on the morning of the 24th they behaved themselves like men. I have to recommend my Orderly Sergeant, David Barry, the two Captains of the Guns, Sergeants Bradley and Miller.

"I have to report the following casualties resulting from the engagement:

"Gun No. 11

"Killed.—William Lenahan.

"Wounded.—George Mayer, John R. Saunders, slightly.

"Gun No. 5

"Killed.—Henry H. Roff.

"Wounded.—Lorin Heath, pretty badly; A. G. Davis, slightly.

"During the attack on the batteries on the 25th instant my men sustained no damage at all."

The following extract from a letter written by Second Lieutenant J. C. Harris, to his uncle, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, is interesting:

"We are lying, with the *Mississippi* opposite New Orleans, ready to shell the place in case it becomes unruly. Forney, Fontane, Broome, Ramsay, and Heisler I have seen or heard of, within a few days. All are well. My leg is so that I can walk on it very readily; but it is sore under the skin, has a bruised feeling. It was only a heavy boot-leg that prevented it from being an ugly wound.

"I am sorry to hear Grant has resigned as I tho't a good deal of him from what little I saw of him.

"The man who hauled down the flag that we placed on the Mint, has been convicted of the deed and hung. It was pretty severe, but it requires severity with these rascals. I would send you some N. Orleans papers, but I see everything important in them is extracts & reprinted by the Northern papers:—which you see. The *Frank Leslie* of May 31, has a picture giving a very good idea of the beginning of the fight at the forts, tho' it is somewhat incorrect."

COMMANDING OFFICERS OF MARINE GUARDS

The Marine Detachments on the various vessels were commanded by the following: *Hartford*, Captain John L. Broome and Second Lieutenant George Heisler; *Brooklyn*, First Lieutenant James Forney; *Mississippi*, Captain P. H. W. Fontane; *Pensacola*, Second Lieutenant J. C. Harris; *Richmond*, First Lieutenant Alan Ramsay; *Portsmouth*, Second Lieutenant William H. Hale; *Iroquois*, Orderly Sergeant Aaron D. Gilbert.

THE CASUALTIES

The following named Marines were killed in action: Corporals George Sanderson and William H. Woods of the *Mississippi*; Corporal Walter J. White and Private Jacob Schoenfeldt of the *Iroquois*; Privates William Lenahan and Henry H. Roff of the *Brooklyn*.

The following named Marines were wounded: Second Lieutenants George Heisler of the *Hartford*, and John C. Hartis of the *Pensacola*; Sergeant Henry A. Stambaugh, and Privates George Perkins, Michael O'Byrne, Frederick Davy, Francis Pepper, John Brogan of the *Pensacola*; Private Henry Cooper of the *Oneida*; Privates Henry King, George White, Lorin Heath, J. R. Saunders, Leonard Killion, A. G. Davis, and George Mayer of the *Brooklyn*; Private Alfred Jackson of the *Iroquois*; Privates T. Gordon, D. McLaughlin, J. Logan, J. McGuire of the *Varuna*; and Private Richard C. Carman of the *Mississippi*.

MARINES AWARDED MEDALS OF HONOR

Three Marines were awarded Medals of Honor for gallantry during these operations, as follows:

James Martin: "Sergeant, United States Marine Corps, on board of the U. S. S. *Richmond*, Mobile Bay, August 5, 1864; commended for coolness and good conduct as captain of a gun in the action of Mobile Bay, on the morning and forenoon of August 5, 1864; was in the actions with Forts Jackson and St. Philip, the Chalmettes, the Rebel ironclads and gunboats below New Orleans, Vicksburg, Port Hudson, and present at the surrender of New Orleans, on board the *Richmond* (G.O. 45, Dec. 31, 1864)."

Andrew Miller: "Sergeant, United States Marine Corps, on board of the U. S. S. *Richmond*, Mobile Bay, August 5, 1864; com-

mended for coolness and good conduct as captain of a gun in the action in Mobile Bay, on the morning and forenoon of August 5, 1864; was on board the *Brooklyn* in the actions with Forts Jackson and St. Philip; the Chalmettes; the Rebel ironclads and gunboats below New Orleans; batteries below Vicksburg; and present at the surrender of New Orleans (G.O. 45, Dec. 31, 1864)."

David Sprowle: "Orderly Sergeant, United States Marine Corps, on board of the U. S. S. *Richmond*, Mobile Bay, August 5, 1864; commended for coolness and for setting a good example to the Marine Guard working a division of *great guns* in the action of Mobile Bay on the morning and forenoon of August 5, 1864. Joined the *Richmond* September 27, 1860; was in the actions with Fort McRea; the Head of the Passes of the Mississippi, Forts Jackson and St. Philip, the Chalmettes, the Rebel ironclads and gunboats below New Orleans, Vicksburg, Port Hudson, and present at the surrender of New Orleans. He has been in the service twenty-eight years (G.O. 45, Dec. 31, 1864)."

OFFICERS BREVETTED

Captain John L. Broome was brevetted a Major, First Lieutenant James Forney a Captain, and Second Lieutenant John C. Harris a First Lieutenant, for gallant and meritorious services at the attacks on Forts Jackson and St. Philip, April 24, 1862.

THANKS OF CONGRESS

The following Resolution of Thanks to Captain David Glasgow Farragut, U. S. Navy, and to the officers and men under his command, was approved July 11, 1862:

"*Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled*, That the thanks of the people and of the Congress of the United States are due, and are hereby tendered to Captain David G. Farragut, of the United States Navy, and to the officers and men under his command, composing his Squadron in the Gulf of Mexico, for their successful operations on the Mississippi River, and for their gallantry displayed in the capture of Forts Jackson and St. Philip, and the City of New Orleans, and in the destruction of the enemy's gunboats and armed flotilla.

"Sec. 2. *And be it further resolved*, That the Secretary of the Navy be directed to communicate this resolution to Captain Farragut, and through him to the officers and men under his command."

THE BATTLE OF BELLEAU WOOD

By EDWIN NORTH MCCLELLAN

MAJOR OF MARINES

THE description of the operations of the Fourth Brigade of Marines in the Château-Thierry sector of the Marne salient up to June 14, 1918, inclusive, is contained in previous numbers of the MARINE CORPS GAZETTE, and this article describes the remainder of these operations. Additional information regarding the operations taking place on June 14, 1918, is also included.

OPERATIONS ON JUNE 14, 1918

On this date Lieutenant Colonel Logan Feland, Second-in-Command to Colonel Wendell C. Neville, of the Fifth Marines, who under orders of Brigadier General James G. Harbord, was in command of all troops in the entire Bois de Belleau, received oral orders to assume command of the 2d Bn., 5th Marines, 1st and 2d Bns., 6th Marines, and one and one-half companies, 1st Bn., 5th Marines, for the purpose of reestablishing the lines and making the position more tenable.

The above-mentioned detachment, 1st Bn., 5th Marines, extended a line, by infiltration during daylight June 14th, from the right of the 1st Bn., 5th Marines (resting on the Lucy-le-Bocage-Torcy Road), to the approximate left centre of the 2d Bn., 5th Marines, in the northern part of the Bois de Belleau. During twilight of the 14th this detachment then advanced its lines northward. After this movement the line extended approximately in an east and west direction and approximately at right angles with that of the 2d Bn., 5th Marines, one company of the latter battalion extending approximately northward beyond the line established by the detachment, 1st Bn., 5th Marines.

The plan of operations at this time provided for the holding of the lines as described above, the employment of interdiction fire by the artillery on all the approaches which the Germans were using to enter the northern tip of the Bois de Belleau, and the exertion of a steady pressure for the purpose of finally forcing the Germans out of the Wood.

The History of the Fifth Regiment of Marines, prepared while the regiment was in Germany, reads substantially in part as follows:

During the night of June 13-14, 1918, the 2d Bn., 6th Marines, was moved up to the woods northwest of Lucy-le-Bocage to support the 2d Bn., 5th Marine, against an expected enemy attack. The enemy attacked the northwest corner of the Bois de Belleau at 1.30 a.m. and were repulsed. The same day a heavy attack against Bouresches was repulsed with severe losses to the enemy.

The 2d Bn., 6th Marines, while on its way up to relieve the exhausted 2d Bn., 5th Marines, was badly gassed and the Commanding Officer of the former reported for the relief about 3.00 a.m., June 14, 1918, with 325 enlisted men instead of 800. The Commanding Officer of the 2d Bn., 5th Marines, did not consider it safe to turn over his position to so few men and the joint attack which had been planned for the morning of June 14, 1918, had to be postponed. Lieutenant Colonel Logan Feland arrived and assumed command of the 2d Bn., 5th Marines, and the 1st Bn. and 2d Bn., 6th Marines, and under him the lines were reestablished and the whole position made more tenable.

The History of the Sixth Regiment of Marines, prepared while the regiment was in Germany, reads substantially in part as follows:

At 1.30 a.m., June 13, 1918, the 2d Bn., 6th Marines, was ordered to take up a position in the woods northwest of Lucy-le-Bocage as Brigade Reserve. A statement of a dying German officer was to the effect that the enemy had brought up a fresh division and intended to attack at dawn. The 2d Bn., 6th Marines, had just reached the woods northwest of Lucy-le-Bocage when a message was received that the enemy had taken Bouresches and that the Commanding Officer of the 2d Bn., 6th Marines, would take two companies of his battalion and move to the woods southeast of Lucy-le-Bocage with a view to counter-attacking. The 78th and 96th Companies were sent on this mission and covered the dangerous two kilometres of open country to this position in open formation and without interference by the enemy artillery. The destination was reached about 8.00 a.m., when the companies dug in. Later developments proved that Bouresches remained in our hands, so the 78th and 96th Companies spent the day in the woods. Early the next morning, June 14, 1918, the enemy shelled these woods with gas and high-explosive shells, causing heavy casualties to the two companies. At 2.00 a.m. this same morning, June 14th, the 2d Bn., 6th Marines, was ordered to relieve the 2d Bn., 5th Marines, in the Bois de Belleau. This relief was accomplished, but by the next afternoon, June 15th, practically all of the 78th and 96th Companies had been evacuated either as wound or gas casualties. The positions in the Bois de Belleau of which the enemy still held a part was a very active sector. The line consisted almost entirely of dangerous salients and enemy machine gun nests. The German artillery and minnenwerfers harassed our positions almost continuously.

The published history of the Sixth Machine Gun Battalion of Marines states that:

From the 12th to the 15th [of June] the situation remained unchanged.

Both sides engaged in harassing fire, the enemy throwing considerable gas shells into Lucy-le-Bocage and Bouresches during that period.

The History of the Fourth Brigade of Marines, prepared while the brigade was in Germany, reads in part as follows:

Beginning about 1 o'clock in the morning of June 14th the enemy shelled our positions in the Bois de Belleau with high explosives and gas. The gas attack caught the 2d Battalion of the 6th Marines as they were arriving to reinforce the 2d Battalion of the 5th Marines.

OPERATIONS ON JUNE 15, 1918

The following memorandum, dated June 15th, regarding the partial relief of the Fourth Brigade of Marines was received the same day from the Chief of Staff:

The Division Commander directs me to inform you as follows:

1. That the 7th Infantry has been placed under your command for a period of six days. It will be used as relief for such battalions of your brigade as you may designate.
2. The Commanding Officer, 7th Infantry, and his battalion commanders will report to you today for orders and for the purpose of making a reconnaissance of that portion of your line to be taken over by them.
3. Relief will be under your direction, one battalion of Marines being relieved by a battalion of the 7th Infantry each successive night, beginning the night of June 15-16 (tonight).
4. On being relieved each battalion will go into billets of the relief battalion of the 7th Infantry to avoid, as far as possible, any movement of transportation.
5. Transportation, rolling kitchens, ration and water carts, etc., will be exchanged temporarily with the 7th Infantry.
6. The Division Commander directs that in connection with the relief immediate steps be taken to give the brigade the proper organization in depth in accordance with instructions already given, placing one battalion in the divisional reserve near Pyramide.
7. Request that location of units be furnished these Headquarters as soon as possible after relief.

In accordance with the above, the following Field Order No. 6, Fourth Brigade, was issued:

1. The enemy holds the general line Bouresches, exclusive, Château Belleau-Torcy.
2. The front held by this Brigade is provisionally modified by orders from the Commanding General 21st (French) Army Corps. The 167th (French)

Division has been ordered to temporarily occupy the ridge running north from Hill 142. The small valley between this ridge and the ridge east of it will be exclusive to this Brigade. The 7th U. S. Infantry has been provisionally added to the 4th Brigade.

3. (a) The relief of the 3d Bn., 6th Marines, north of 142 by the 167th (French) Division will take place the night of June 15-16. The 3d Bn., 6th Marines, relieved will take station in the wood about 170.0-259.5 as Division Reserve.

(b) The 1st Bn., 7th Infantry, will relieve the 2d Bn., 5th Marines, and 2d Bn., 6th Marines, as soon as possible after dark tonight. The 2d Bn., 6th Marines, when relieved, will take station in the Bois Gros Jean, north of the Paris-Metz Road. The 2d Bn., 5th Marines, will take station in the vicinity of Mery.

(c) Orders will be given later for the disposition of the 2d Bn. and 3d Bn., 7th Infantry.

(x) The Marine battalions which go to the station vacated by the arriving 7th Inf. battalions will exchange with them temporarily for their transportation, rolling kitchens, ration and water carts, etc. Details of this temporary exchange will be arranged by Battalion Commanders.

(y) Command passes when relief is completed.

(z) Artillery plans remain as ordered.

4. Trains remain in place.

5. Brigade and Regimental P. C.'s remain in place.

The report of the Commanding General, Fourth Brigade, for the twenty-four hours ending at 8 p.m., June 15th, to the Commanding General, Second Division is as follows:

1. General aspects of the day: Quiet.

2. Report of events: The night from 8.00 p.m. until daylight passed without serious event. The topography is so difficult and the woods so dense in the north half of the Bois de Belleau that the troops that have occupied it have been unable to entirely clear it of the enemy. There is a small knoll in the western part of the north end of the wood on which there are an estimated number of 40 or 60 Germans with several machine guns. Effort has been made all day to so surround this party and manœuvre it that it would be taken without loss of life, which must follow a direct assault on a knoll crowned with machine guns. The attempt has not so far been successful, but the lines have been drawn and the woods cleaned absolutely except for this knoll and there are troops now on two sides with the lines joining in a "V" whose open end is toward the west. The ravine through which these men could escape is now believed to be commanded by our machine guns, which also prevent the entrance of any other of the enemy to join this party. Report was made to me late this afternoon that while the C. O. of the troops on the ground believed that he could force this position in a few minutes, yet he realized that it would mean a considerable loss of life and felt certain that with a little more time these men could be taken or driven out without much loss of life, so I

ordered him to carry out the plan he had in mind, and matters are now in that state. The open end of the angle is also closed by artillery fire.

3. Orders were received from Division Headquarters attaching the 7th U. S. Infantry for a period of six days. The Battalion Commander and four captains reported for reconnaissance between 1 and 2 p.m. and have thoroughly reconnoitred the wood. The Lieutenant Colonel commanding the Battalion is thoroughly conversant with the conditions related as to the machine gun nest in the wood and expressed himself in accord with the plan. The woods have been thoroughly reconnoitred and the battalion is at hand to march up from Montreuil as soon as darkness covers. Orders have been received from the Corps Commander, and from the Commanding General, 2d Division, for the temporary taking over of a portion of the line, the ridge running north from 142, by the 167th (French) Division. That relief will take place tonight. The 3d Bn., 6th Marines, to be relieved by the French, takes station in Reserve. The 2d Bn. of the 5th Marines, relieved by the 1st Bn., 7th Infantry, goes to Mery. The 2d Bn., 6th Marines, also relieved (the battalion which suffered so from gas yesterday), takes station in the Bois Gros Jean, south of the Paris-Metz Road, half a kilometre S. W. of these Headquarters.

4. The enemy's artillery has not been especially active today. The fact that our artillery used gas last night in return for the gas sent over by the enemy yesterday appears now to be understood by him as retaliatory and he has not been known to have thrown any gas today.

5. Aviation has been especially active today. At one time 10 German planes were seen this afternoon and 7 balloons. A disabled French plane was found on the road west of Lucy this morning with no one with it. Harbord.

OPERATIONS ON JUNE 16, 1918

The following message was received from the Commanding Officer of the Sixth Marines:

I would like you to inform me as to my status on the front. I have not been relieved of command of the "6th Marine sector" but don't know just my relation to the 167th French Division who relieved the 3d Bn. of the 6th, and the 1st Bn., 7th Inf., who relieved the 2d Bn. of the 5th. If my responsibility in the sector has ceased I shall move my P. C. back. Lee.

The Commanding General, Fourth Brigade, sent the following message to the Commanding Officer, Sixth Regiment:

The taking over of a great part of the 6th Marine's sector by the 167th French Division, over whom no one in this Brigade exercises any authority, and that fact coupled with the fact that our activity centres now around the Bois de Belleau, makes it necessary to relieve you of any responsibility in your former sector for the present. I desire you to give all the energies of yourself and staff to the reorganization of your two battalions that are now in rest and the one which will go tomorrow morning to rest near Mery. Every effort should

be made to see that their equipment is completed, that the replacements recently arrived and others soon to arrive are assimilated and the battalions put in the best condition possible for eventualities. Please give especial attention to the matter of their equipment, their complete rest and in general to anything that will put them in shape to continue the superb work which everybody has learned to expect of your Regiment. You are authorized to move your P. C. to the vicinity of your Battalions if you desire to do so. Harbord.

The following order was issued to the Commanding Officer, Fifth Marines, at 4.30 p.m., June 16th:

On the arrival of the 2d Bn., 7th Inf., please relieve with it the 1st Bn., 6th Marines, in the south half of the Bois de Belleau. The 1st Bn., 6th Marines, when relieved, will proceed by marching to the vicinity of Montreuil, where it will take trucks and proceed to near Mery to the station vacated by the 2d Bn., 7th Inf. The battalions will exchange temporarily their transportation, rolling kitchens, ration and water carts, etc. Details of this temporary change will be arranged by battalion commanders.

Command passes when relief is completed. Harbord.

The report of the Brigade Commander to the Commanding General, Second Division, for the twenty-four hours ending 8 p.m., June 16th, is as follows:

1. General aspects of the day: Quiet.
2. Report of events: The 1st Bn., 7th Infantry, relieved the 2d Bn., 5th Marines, and 2d Bn., 6th Marines, last night as per orders. The relief was accomplished without serious event. The 7th Infantry lost about half a dozen men during the relief from shell fire. There were two attacks on the north end of the Bois de Belleau between midnight and daylight. They were easily repulsed by rifle fire with the assistance of the artillery. In my opinion they were nothing more than strong German patrols. The 3d Bn., 6th Marines, was relieved in the sector southwest of Torcy by the 167th D. I. [French].
3. The enemy's artillery has shown its usual activity. There has been fire of the very heavy calibre on the road between Marigny and Montreuil. Probably a dozen shells have been placed on that road.
4. Aviation very active today. Ten German planes came over in formation this morning and destroyed one French balloon. Allied planes are seldom seen and the enemy's planes have been very active. His balloons have been up practically all day. Three French balloons up this afternoon.
5. Nothing else of importance to report. Harbord.

During the short time the Seventh Infantry was stationed in the Bois de Belleau, Colonel Wendell C. Neville of the Fifth Marines remained in command of all the troops in the Wood. With him remained his Second-in-Command, Lieutenant Colonel Logan

Feland, and staff. When the 1st Bn., 7th Infantry, had, on June 16, 1918, fully completed the relief of the Marine Battalions, the exercise of command over the troops mentioned under date of June 14, 1918, by Lieutenant Colonel Feland, terminated.

OPERATIONS ON JUNE 17, 1918

The following order was sent to the Commanding Officer, Fifth Marines:

On the arrival of the 3d Bn., 7th Inf., please relieve with it the 1st Bn., 5th Marines. The 1st Bn., 5th Marines, when relieved will proceed by marching to the vicinity of Montreuil, where it will take trucks and proceed to or near Mery to the station vacated by the 3d Bn., 7th Inf. The battalions will exchange temporarily their transportation, rolling kitchens, ration and water carts, etc. Details of this temporary exchange will be arranged by battalion commanders. Command passes when relief is completed. Harbord.

The report of events for the twenty-four hours ending 8 p.m., June 17, 1918, to the Commanding Officer, Second Division, is as follows:

1. General aspects of the day: Quiet.
2. Report of events: The 2d Bn., 7th Inf., relieved the 1st Bn., 6th Marines, last night as per orders. Relief accomplished without serious event. Some fire on the northern end of the Bois de Belleau between midnight and daylight, reported by the 1st Bn., 7th Inf., as an attack repulsed; probably German patrols.
3. The enemy's artillery has been quite active. The dressing station and Regimental P. C. at La Voie du Chatel has been shelled all day. The woods north of the Ferme Paris have also been shelled.
4. Aviation quite active. Number of German planes over this morning and they have been busy all day. It is almost impossible to make a move in this area without coming under the eye of a balloon observer. Our aviation is either passive or non-existent. Three French balloons have been up today; numerous German balloons.
5. Nothing else of importance to report. Harbord.

BANDSMEN NOT TO BE USED AS STRETCHER-BEARERS

On June 17, 1918, the Brigade Commander issued the following memorandum:

1. The Brigade Commander directs that hereafter bandsmen be not used as stretcher-bearers, but that they be kept with the rear echelon.

OPERATIONS ON JUNE 18, 1918

The Brigade Commander's report to the Commanding General, Second Division for the period ending 8 p.m., June 18, 1918, is as follows:

1. General aspects of the day: Quiet.
2. Report of events: The 3d Bn., 7th Inf., relieved the 1st Bn., 5th Marines, during the night. The latter proceeded to station at former station of 3d Bn., 7th Inf. Relief without event. The Brigade Headquarters was visited by the Commanding General, 21st Army Corps [French] this morning.
3. Enemy artillery about as usual. Several 150 calibre dropped today in and in the vicinity of Montreuil.
4. Enemy aviation active as usual. Allied aviation passive or non-existent.
5. Nothing else of importance to report. Harbord.

OPERATIONS ON JUNE 19, 1918

The Brigade Commander's report to the Commanding General, Second Division for the period ending 8 p.m., June 19, 1918, is as follows:

1. General aspects of the day: Quiet.
2. Report of events: An unsuccessful attempt made last night by a battalion of the 7th Inf. to secure identifications. A small patrol went into ravine about a kilometre south of Torcy but failed to capture any of the enemy. The 1st Bn., 7th Inf., in north end of Bois de Belleau reports killing about 12 Germans outside of woods. Orders have been given that attempt be made to get these bodies tonight, and secure identification if possible.
3. Enemy artillery: Inactive.
4. Enemy aviation: Fairly active.
5. Nothing of importance to report. Harbord.

OPERATIONS ON JUNE 20, 1918

The Brigade Commander's report to the Commanding General, Second Division for the period ending 8 p.m., June 20, 1918, is as follows:

1. General aspects of the day. Quiet. Cloudy. Cool.
2. Events: 3d Bn., 7th Inf., occupied the line along the ravine east and west from Y line 174 to crossroads at 174.8-263.1 without opposition, at 1.00 a.m. Position entrenched. One platoon occupied position astride of road at 174.6-262.6. Position entrenched. Attack ordered on machine gun nest of northwestern edge of Bois de Belleau failed because companies of 7th Infantry fell back when a few casualties occurred. * * * Co. B, 4th Machine Gun Bn., relieved 23d Co., 6th Machine Gun Bn., in the Bois de

Belleau. Relief completed 4.40 a.m. and 23d Co. went to station in Bois Gros Jean at 8.35 a.m.

3. Artillery activity: Comparatively quiet on the front. Sounds of hostile firing to our left. Aviation quiet.

4. Nothing further to report. Harbord.

OPERATIONS ON JUNE 21, 1918

At noon the following Field Order No. 7, Fourth Brigade, pertaining to the relief of the Seventh Infantry was issued:

1. The relief of the 7th Infantry from this Brigade will be made June 21-22-23, 1918.

2. (a) The 3d Bn., 5th Marines, to relieve the 1st Bn., 7th Infantry, night of June 21-22.

(b) The 3d Bn., 6th Marines, to relieve the 2d Bn., 7th Infantry, night of June 22-23.

(c) The 2d Bn., 5th Marines, to relieve the 3d Bn., 7th Infantry, night of June 23-24.

(d) Each bn., 7th Infantry, when relieved will march to former station at or near Mery.

(x) Reliefs will take place as soon as practicable after dark on nights indicated. Command passes when relief is completed.

(y) Reconnaissance by bn. and co. comdrs during day preceding entry into line.

3. Movements of 4th Brigade preliminary to relief of 7th Inf.:

(a) 3d Bn., 6th Marines, to wood n. w. of Lucy-le-Bocage as Brigade Reserve, night of June 21-22.

(b) 2d Bn., 5th Marines, to Bois Gros Jean as Division Reserve, night of June 21-22; to wood n. w. of Lucy-le-Bocage as Brigade Reserve, night of June 22-23.

(c) 2d Bn., 6th Marines, to wood n. w. of Lucy-le-Bocage as Brigade Reserve, night of June 23-24.

(d) 1st Bn., 6th Marines, to Bois Gros Jean as Division Reserve, night of June 23-24.

(e) 1st Bn., 5th Marines, to Bois Gros Jean, night of June 23-24.

4. Medical and sanitary personnel of 7th Inf. to be relieved with the bns. to which attached. Regimental Surgeon and personnel of dressing station to be relieved on night of June 23-24.

5. The utmost care will be taken to avoid aerial observation in making the changes required in this order.

6. The sector Bouresches, exclusive, Bois de Belleau to road with double row of trees running N. E.-S. W. near 133, inclusive, will be the 5th Marine Sector under the C. O., 5th Marines. The sector from west limit of 5th Marines Sector, exclusive, to west limit of 2d Div. Y line 174 will be the 6th Marines Sector under the C. O., 6th Marines. This division of sectors effective on the relief of the 3d Bn., 7th Inf., night of June 23-24.

The report of the Brigade Commander to the Commanding General, Second Division, for the twenty-four hours ending at 8 p.m., June 21, 1918, follows:

1. General aspects of the day: Quiet. Cloudy.
2. Report of events: * * *
3. Nothing special to note regarding enemy artillery activity. Reported as very active on the Bois de Belleau this morning. Our artillery were asked for retaliatory fire and the fire of the enemy slackened very noticeably.
4. Enemy aviation: Not as active as usual.
5. * * * Major Waller, whose services were requested as commander of the 6th Machine Gun Battalion, reported for duty.
6. * * *
7. Nothing else of importance to report. Harbord.

Captain George H. Osterhout was relieved in command of the Sixth Machine Gun Battalion by Major Littleton W. T. Waller, Jr., on June 21st.

OPERATIONS ON JUNE 22, 1918

The following message was sent to the 3d Bn., Sixth Marines (through C. O., Fifth Marines):

1. As soon as you are established in the Bois de Belleau hurry the completion of the wiring on the east side.
2. Start details to cutting some paths from east to west through the Bois, so your supports can get through to your front line.
3. Establish communication with the 23d Infantry in Bouresches.
4. Push patrols out from several places in your line to locate the enemy. If possible get in some live or dead Germans for identifications. The location of the enemy is most important for you and the identifications are necessary. The space between you and the Germans belongs to us. Take possession with night patrols. Harbord.

The Brigade Commander's report to the Commanding General, Second Division, for the twenty-four hours ending 8 p.m., June 22, 1918, follows:

1. General aspects of the day: Quiet. Cloudy. Cool.
2. Events of the day: The 1st Bn., 7th Inf., extended its line without opposition last night from crossroads south of Torcy (174.8-263.1) to about 175.2-262.5. Connection has been established by messenger between our troops in the northern half of the Bois de Belleau and the right of this battalion of the 7th Infantry.
3. The statement made by a German deserter last night that the German

line ran through the north end of the Bois de Belleau proves to be practically true. Personal reconnaissance by Lieutenant Colonel Feland establishes the fact that the tip of the woods is held by the enemy. Lieutenant Colonel Feland is certain no trenches run through the north end of the woods, but undoubtedly the Germans have access to that part of the woods and have been free to come and go. * * *

4. The Commanding Officer, 3d Bn., 5th Marines, now in there has been told that this is intolerable and that he will clean the woods by 10 o'clock tomorrow night; further that the space does not permit the use of more troops than he now has * * * the battalion commander, has been directed to submit his plan for approval before making the attack.

5. * * *

6. Enemy artillery: As usual. Enemy aviation: As usual.

7. Miscellaneous: Every effort is being made to push reconnaissance to the front tonight and secure some identifications. The circulars in German sent from Division Headquarters have been sent to the front in line battalions for distribution. The wiring on the front of the southern half of the Bois de Belleau will be completed tonight. Not much has been done on the northern half due to the constant fighting. The wiring at the right of the Brigade position extends to within 150 yards of the village of Bouresches.

8. Orders have been given to cut trails through the Bois de Belleau by which supports can quickly get through from the rear to the front. Reports are that the constant artillery firing in the Bois de Belleau has greatly thinned out the wood and made progress through it less difficult than at first.

9. Nothing further to report. Harbord.

The History of the Fourth Brigade of Marines, prepared while the brigade was in Germany, reads in part as follows:

On June 22d, Lieutenant Colonel Logan Feland made a personal reconnaissance of the northern end of the Bois de Belleau and returned with a complete report as to conditions in the woods. In this connection it is necessary to explain that although the Brigade received partial relief by the battalions of the 7th Infantry, it was necessary to retain Colonel Wendell C. Neville as the Commanding Officer of the sector occupied by the 5th Regiment and the 7th Infantry and all operations during that period came within his jurisdiction.

ATTACK IN BELLEAU WOOD ON JUNE 23, 1918

The 3d Bn., 5th Marines, attacked the enemy in the northern end of the Bois de Belleau, the attack commencing at 7 p.m., June 23, 1918, when the 16th and 20th Companies sent out combat groups ahead of the line. The results of this attack are shown in the following reports of the Brigade Commander to the Commanding General, Second Division:

The report of the Brigade Commander to the Commanding General, Second Division for the twenty-four hours ending 8 p.m., June 23, 1918, follows:

1. General aspects of the day: Quiet. Clear. Cool.
2. Report of events up to 8.00 p.m.: No special event during the day until 7.00 p.m. when an attack was begun on Germans remaining in the north tip of the Bois de Belleau. The attack by the 3d Bn., 5th Marines. * * * Report received at time of writing that attack is making progress slowly with a little shelling on the front line companies.
3. Enemy artillery fairly active in the neighborhood of principal roads. Reported this evening that another ammunition dump located at the crossroads by Ferme Paris was exploded and some of the buildings struck. Enemy aviation active. Number of planes in air at time of writing this report.
4. Reports from the Bois de Belleau indicate that when the wood is finally cleared and matters stabilized somewhat that considerable salvage will be had; a good many German guns; some quantities of German ammunition; even German clothing, soap and some canned food have been found there in considerable quantities. No doubt it has been much scattered by the shelling the place has suffered and in actual value may not amount to much. It is significant as indicating the importance to which the Germans attached to the possession of the Bois de Belleau.
5. The Commanding General of the French Army Corps visited these Headquarters today with his Chief of Staff. The Chief of the 1st American Corps with staff officers visited here this afternoon. Harbord.

Major Ralph S. Keyser relieved Lieutenant Colonel Frederic M. Wise in command of the 2d Bn., Fifth Marines, on June 23, 1918, following the departure of Lieutenant Colonel Wise to the School of the Line at Langres.

OPERATIONS ON JUNE 24, 1918

The following message was sent to the 2d Bn., 5th Marines, through the Commanding Officer, Sixth Marines:

1. The position turned over to your battalion is not exactly as reported by the 3d Bn., 7th Inf., in that it does not run out to 175.2-262.6 where their right was supposed to be. They occupied a line of individual pits, of which there are believed to be two rows near each other. I desire your line to be advanced tonight to the road with the double row of trees which runs just west of the Bois de Belleau, and dug in, so as to conform approximately to sketch sent you herewith. This will very greatly facilitate operations in the Bois.
2. You are cautioned that two companies are considered enough for your entire front line, and that your support (two companies) should be back in the woods where it will be well in hand near your P. C. if needed.

3. It is expected that you will push patrols out tonight and get some identifications of what is in front of you if enemy is still there. Send picked men in groups of two or three and find out definitely where the enemy's lines are. The artillery will not fire west of the double row of trees on road near Bois nor south of Torcy unless requested by you. Harbord.

The following memorandum was sent to the Commanding Officers of the Fifth and Sixth Marines:

For the greater convenience of handling the sectors of which you are in charge, you will exchange P. C.'s, the change to take effect tomorrow morning. Harbord.

The following memorandum was issued to all members of the Brigade giving directions for an attack at 5 p.m., June 25th:


The 3d Bn., 5th Marines, will be withdrawn from its present position to the X line 262 before 3 o'clock tomorrow morning, June 25th. The artillery will be free to fire from that hour anywhere north of the line 262 as far east as the railroad and as far west as the road with the double row of trees which runs just west of the Bois de Belleau. It is desired that the fire be intense enough from 3 o'clock on to prevent the entrance of any Germans and that for a period of about an hour before 5.00 p.m., June 25th, it be made of maximum intensity. It will be the intention to follow the artillery preparation by an attack with the 3d Bn., 5th Marines, at 5.00 p.m., on the 25th. The rate of advance of the infantry will not exceed 100 metres each three minutes. The objective of the advance is the north edge of the Bois de Belleau. Harbord.


The report of the Commanding General, Fourth Brigade, to the Commanding General, Second Division, for the events of the twenty-four hours ending 8 p.m., June 24, 1918, follows:

1. General aspects of the day: Quiet. Cool. Cloudy.
2. Report of events: The attack last night on the machine gun nests in the north end of the Bois de Belleau was a failure. * * * The left company advanced according to plan and drove the Germans about 200 yards. The right company was unable to advance because within 20 yards of its former position it came under machine gun fire. The plan was used of sending small groups with hand grenades and V. B.'s preceding the company in skirmish line. The enemy appeared to have a succession of machine gun positions echeloned in depth. As the troops approached the crews would vacate the positions, fleeing with the guns and immediately the advancing Marines would come under the fire of other machine guns. After trying in vain to advance further the left company was halted and at daylight was allowed to fall back to its original position where it had intrenchments for protection. Today a conference was had with the artillery commander and the battalion and regi-

Antrim

LA VOIE DU CHATEL, HEADQUARTERS OF THE FIFTH MARINES IN JUNE, 1918





LA LOGE FARM. BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS IN JUNE, 1918

Antrim

mental commanders, at which the Commanding General, 2d Division, was present and with the results of which he is familiar. [Note: Memorandum above, outlining attack for 5.00 p.m., tomorrow, was the result mentioned in the foregoing sentence.] Another effort will be made tomorrow afternoon, preceded by a careful artillery preparation.

3. The relief of the 3d Bn., 7th Inf., by the 2d Bn., 5th Marines, was accomplished without event.

4. Enemy artillery as usual. Enemy aviation: Airplanes active. Twelve enemy airplanes in air over us at one time. Nothing further to report. Harbord.

OPERATIONS ON JUNE 25, 1918

At 1 a.m., June 25th, the extent of sector, the battle line, and the location of the various units of the Fourth Brigade, in line and in reserve were as follows:

Brigade Sector: The line running approximately from 174.0-263.4 to 175.1-262.7 was held by the 2d Bn., 5th Marines.

That part of the Bois de Belleau, with the exception of the northern tip upon which the attack was being made early on June 25th, was held by the 3d Bn., 5th Marines.

The line running approximately from 176.0-262.0 to 176.4-261.2 was held by the 3d Bn., 6th Marines.

Battalions in Line: Left to right: 2d Bn., 5th Marines; 3d Bn., 5th Marines; and 3d Bn., 6th Marines.

Battalions in Reserve: 2d Bn., 6th Marines (Brigade Reserve), in woods N.W. of Lucy-le-Bocage; 1st Bn., 5th Marines (Division Reserve), and the 1st Bn., 6th Marines, in the Bois Gros Jean.

The following message was sent to the Commanding Officer, 3d Bn., 6th Marines, through the Commanding Officer, Fifth Marines:

I have asked the artillery to not put any shells tonight east of Bois de Belleau, south of X line 262 west of the railroad unless you request it. This is to give you an opportunity to send patrols out in this region and secure prisoners.

Please caution patrols that rank, regimental insignia, and papers must be brought in from bodies of any dead Germans encountered. Harbord.

The attack in the north end of the Bois de Belleau commenced at 5 p.m., June 25, 1918. The Commanding Officer, 2d Bn., 5th Marines, reported to Commanding Officer, Fifth Marines, at 5.55 p.m., as follows:

Attack started O. K. at 5.00 p.m. Heavy firing on us just before we jumped off. Several casualties. Very little machine gun fire. Telephone line

out. Runner reported seven prisoners and one captain also prisoner, carrying back wounded. The two left platoons, 16th Company, reported grenades and snipers working on them. No report from companies yet. Will go through if humanly possible.

A message, in substance as follows, was sent by the Commanding General, Fourth Brigade Marines, to the Commanding Officer, Fifth Marines:

Contingent upon the Commanding Officer, 3d Bn., 5th Marines, obtaining his objective, orders were sent this afternoon to the Commanding Officer, 2d Bn., 5th Marines, to advance his line tonight and bring the right of the line on the double tree road just west of Bois de Belleau. This will begin shortly after dark. Please notify the Commanding Officer, 3d Bn., 5th Marines, that the movement is going to take place so that in the dark he will not confuse it with a possible counter-attack.

The movements of the Commanding Officer, 2d Bn., 5th Marines, will be preceded by considerable artillery firing on the old trenches which run northwest from the Bois de Belleau.

At 11.20 p.m., June 25, 1918, the Commanding General, Fourth Brigade Marines, sent a letter to the Commanding Officer, Fifth Marines, reading substantially as follows:

Your Third Battalion has done splendid work. I have no fear of a counter-attack by the Germans tonight. You are in charge of the Bois de Belleau and can divert such part of the 3d Bn., 6th Marines, as you think best. Its front is practically wired in. In connection with the movement of the 2d Bn., 5th Marines, to connect up with the west side of Bois de Belleau, I have ordered its commanding officer to send a Platoon by his right rear to come up on the left of the 16th Company and help clean that edge of the woods. It is very important that the Commanding Officer of the 3d Bn., 5th Marines, be told of this in order that the 16th Company may not, in the dark, confuse that Platoon with the enemy.

At 11.50 p.m., June 25, 1918, the Commanding General, Fourth Brigade, made the following report for the twenty-four hours ending 11 p.m., that date:

1. General aspects of the day: Quiet, except for the artillery preparation by us on the north end of the Bois de Belleau.

2. Events of the day: Pursuant to arrangements made yesterday artillery preparation went on in the Bois de Belleau today until 5.00 p.m., when the 3d Bn., 5th Marines, attacked to clear the wood of Germans. The companies assigned to clear the north end and east side obtained their objectives and have dug in. The company assigned to clear the left edge has not completed its

work but it is believed it will accomplish it. There are no prisoners reported in from this company yet. From the remainder of the Command * * * [the Commander 2d Bn., 5th Marines] reports that he has 150 prisoners and that others are arriving which he has no time to count. Actually 25 prisoners have passed Brigade Headquarters and reports indicate that probably over 150 more are to be counted on. The number of German dead reported * * * are considerable. Our casualties reported * * * as heavy. Dressing stations report about 70 have thus far been evacuated.

3. Artillery action: About as usual. Aviation action: As usual. One plane, believed to be enemy, was seen by me to go down about 11.00 a.m. today. Nothing else of importance. Harbord.

“WOODS NOW U. S. MARINE CORPS ENTIRELY”

Fighting in the effort to clear Bois de Belleau of the Germans continued throughout the night of June 25-26, 1918.

The following supplementary report was made by the Commanding General, Fourth Brigade, to the Commanding General, Second Division, at 9.50 a.m., June 26th:

1. Supplementary to my report for twenty-four hours ending 11.00 p.m. last night, June 25th, the following is submitted.

2. All companies of * * * Third Battalion, Fifth Marines, now in position around edge of Bois de Belleau. * * * [The C. O., 3d Bn., 5th Marines] reports “Woods now U. S. Marine Corps entirely.” * * * [on June 26, 1918.]

3. The 2d Bn., 5th Marines, which holds the sector west of Bois de Belleau, reports that its line was extended last night to the double-tree road which runs just west of Bois de Belleau and connection established with * * * men [of 3d Bn., 5th Marines] in the edge of the woods. I have not the exact coördinates of the right of this position as yet, but know that it is on the double-tree road and presume it to be in the neighborhood of 175.4-262.6. All accounts agree as to the excellent spirit of officers and men yesterday. * * *

4. * * *

5. The Brigade appreciates very much the congratulatory word of its Division and Corps Commanders. The undersigned takes special pride in publishing the congratulatory telegram to the Brigade. Harbord.

The above-mentioned telegram will be found at the end of this article.

The Journal of Operations, Second Division, for June 26, 1918, contains the following:

Early in the morning [of June 26th] Major Shearer reports “Woods now United States Marine Corps entirely.” Our lines now include the entire Bois de Belleau. This last attack netted in captures, 10 heavy, 8 light machine guns,

5 automatics, with large quantities of ammunition, other material and prisoners —7 officers and 302 men. Casualties passed through our dressing station for the twenty-four hours ending 6.00 hours, June 26th, was 260.

At 8.15 a.m., June 26th, the following memorandum was issued to the Commanding Officers of the Fifth Marines, Sixth Marines, 3d Bn., 5th Marines, and 2d Bn., 6th Marines:

1. The Second Battalion, Sixth Regiment Marines, as soon as possible tonight, June 26-27, will relieve the Third Battalion, Fifth Regiment Marines, in the north end of Bois de Belleau.
2. Battalion and Company Commanders will make reconnaissance today. The Third Battalion, Fifth Marines, when relieved will take station in the Bois Gros Jean.
3. Command passes when relief is completed. Harbord.

At 8.30 a.m. the following order was issued to the 1st Bn., 6th Marines:

At dark tonight move your battalion to the woods northwest of Lucy-le-Bocage as Brigade Reserve. Your battalion will furnish a detail, daily or nightly, of approximately 200 men for work on the support trenches in that sector. Harbord.

The following order was issued by the Brigade Commander to the Commanding Officer, 2d Bn., 5th Marines, through the Commanding Officer, 6th Marines, dated June 26, 1918.

Make your preparations and as soon as possible after dark tonight swing your line forward so that it will run approximately straight from the cross-roads south of Torcy (174.75-263.1) to the double-tree road at 175.4-262.7. I will have the artillery keep down any fire from the trenches running northwest from the Bois de Belleau between 10 and 12 p.m. Harbord.

The following message was sent by the Brigade Commander at 2.55 p.m., June 26th, to the Commanding Officer, Fifth Marines, and the Commanding Officer, Sixth Marines.

1. Please see that Battalion Commanders reduce the number of men in their front lines to the lowest number consistent with safety in holding the line when attacked until their supports can be brought up.
2. The Battalion support should consist of one or more companies, held together, as a rule, near the Battalion P. C. It should not consist of detached platoons of different companies held just back of the companies in line. If a company cannot be spared for Battalion Support, the platoons should belong to the same company, and should be stationed as stated. Tactical unity should be preserved as far as possible.

3. If a company commander given a front line sector to hold with his company can so organize that not all the company is needed then he should hold one or more platoons in Company Support near his P. C.

4. Under present conditions with the necessity of regular reliefs of battalions in line without regard to regiments it is not considered practicable to use a Regimental Reserve.

5. Observation of the manner in which battalion commanders handle the distribution of their commands in depth indicates that the matter is not entirely understood by them. They have in some cases held platoons of several companies stationed nearly in rear of companies and subject to the same shell-fire as the front line, and not in hand for use by the Battalion Commander as a real Battalion Support.

6. The wiring must proceed with all practicable speed, and the number of companies in the front line be reduced to the minimum. Properly organized it is not believed that either of the three battalion sectors now held require more than two companies in the actual front line. The remainder as Battalion Support should be stationed as indicated in Paragraph 2, above.

7. Regimental Commanders are requested to explain the theory of the Support to any officer that does not appear to be familiar with it, and to without delay carry it out in their respective sectors. Harbord.

The report of the Commanding General, Fourth Brigade, for the twenty-four hours ending at 8.55 p.m., June 26th, to the Commanding General, Second Division, is as follows:

1. General aspects of the day. Quiet. Clear.

2. Events of the day: No particular event since supplementary report submitted this morning. Prisoners in small groups continue to come through enroute to Division Headquarters. Reported at 8.00 p.m. that a few wounded German prisoners are passing through hospital. Statement is made by Battalion Commander in northern end of Bois de Belleau that there is considerable number of wounded Germans to be gotten out. Reported about 6.00 p.m. that the enemy was throwing some gas into north end of Bois de Belleau. Statement only covered the throwing of a few shells and is not credited by me.

3. Enemy artillery: As usual. A number of heavy shells thrown on region just west of these Headquarters this afternoon. Enemy aviation: active. Considerable number of planes in air at several times today. Nothing further to report. Harbord.

OPERATIONS ON JUNE 27, 1918

The Brigade Diary contains the following notation, under date of June 27, 1918:

From this date until June 30th, the last day covered by this diary, activities were comparatively quiet. Therefore only the orders for reliefs of battalions and reports of events of every twenty-four hours is given herewith. This is

followed by a number of congratulatory messages received during the month. The Brigade relief took place within a few days following the last date of this diary and will be covered in July diary.

The congratulatory messages above referred to will be found at the end of this article.

The following message was sent by the Commanding General, Fourth Brigade, to the Commanding Officer, 2d Bn., 5th Marines, through the Commanding Officer, Sixth Regiment:

Orders have been given Major Holcomb to direct two Platoons of the 51st Company to return to their Battalion after dark.

I am very much pleased with the success in advancing your line in the way you did last night. Please let Captain Wass and your other officers know that it was a good piece of work. Harbord.

The report of the Commanding General, Fourth Brigade, for the twenty-four hours ending at 8 p.m., June 27th, to the Commanding General, Second Division, is as follows:

1. General aspects of the day: Quiet. Clear.
2. Events of the day: The line occupied by the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, moved its right forward pivoting on crossroads south of Torcy last night connecting up with its right on the double-tree road near 175.2-262.5. This movement was made under cover of artillery fire on the presumed position of the German line on its front and movement was accomplished without loss. The 3d Bn., 6th Marines, in the north end of the Bois de Belleau. Third Bn., 5th Marines, to Bois Gros Jean for rest.
3. Some gas shells thrown on north end of Bois de Belleau last night. Also in neighboring vicinity as well as Maison Blanche and on woods near La Voie du Chatel.

Aviation: Active. Reported at 7 o'clock this evening that four enemy balloons were brought down north of here. Nothing else of importance to report.

OPERATIONS ON JUNE 28, 1918

The report of the Commanding General, Fourth Brigade, for the twenty-four hours ending at 8.25 p.m., June 28th, to the Commanding General, Second Division, is as follows:

1. General aspects of the day: Quiet.
2. Events of the day: None of importance. Brigade Headquarters were visited by Inspector General, Am. E. F.
3. Enemy artillery appears to be less active than usual. Considerable shelling on the Metz-Paris road at time of writing this report. Aviation active, a number of aerial battles. Nothing further of importance to report. Harbord.

At 10 p.m., the following order was issued by the Commanding General, Fourth Brigade, to the Commanding Officer, Fifth Marines, Commanding Officer, Sixth Marines, Commanding Officer, 1st Bn., 6th Marines, Commanding Officer, 3d Bn., 6th Marines, and the Commanding Officer, 1st Bn., 5th Marines:

The 1st Bn., 6th Marines, will relieve the 3d Bn., 6th Marines, in the Bois de Belleau as soon as practicable after dark, night of June 29-30. Reconnaissance by Battalion and Company Commanders during the day June 29th, 3d Bn., 6th Marines, to Bois Gros Jean south of Metz-Paris Road as Division Reserve. First Bn., 5th Marines, to woods N. W. of Lucy-le-Bocage, night of June 29-30 as Brigade Reserve. Harbord.

OPERATIONS ON JUNE 29, 1918

The report of the Commanding General, Fourth Brigade, for the twenty-four hours ending at 8 p.m., June 29th, to the Commanding General, Second Division, was as follows:

1. General aspects of the day: Quiet. Weather bright.
2. Events of the day: The Brigade Headquarters were visited by Major General Liggett, Commanding First Corps, Am. E. F.
3. The undersigned visited the Bois de Belleau and inspected the Battalion stationed therein this afternoon. No one who has not visited that wood can comprehend the heroism of the troops which finally cleared it of Germans. The bringing out of salvage is progressing, ration carts coming out every night filled with salvage of various sorts which is taken to the location of the kitchens near Montreuil and from there to the Service-of-the-Rear by the Regimental Quartermasters. The woods are still very full of salvage of all sorts. There are a great many unburied dead near the edge of the wood, but they are being buried as fast as possible. The wiring on the front of the south half of the wood from Bouresches north is practically completed. The wire for the north half will be gotten in tonight and the wiring will be done tomorrow night.
3. Enemy artillery: About as usual. Enemy aviation: About as usual. Nothing further of importance to report. Harbord.

OPERATIONS ON JUNE 30, 1918

The following order was issued at 11 a.m., June 30th, by the Commanding General, Fourth Brigade, to the Commanding Officer, Fifth Marines, Commanding Officer, Sixth Marines, Commanding Officer, 1st Bn., 5th Marines, and Commanding Officer, 2d Bn., 5th Marines:

1. The 2d Bn., 5th Marines, will be relieved as soon as possible after dark tonight by the 1st Bn., 5th Marines. Reconnaissance by Battalion and Company Commanders during the day of June 30th.

2. The 2d Bn., 5th Marines, will take station in woods northwest of Lucy-le-Bocage. Harbord.

At 12 noon, June 30th, the Commanding General, Fourth Brigade, issued the following order to the Commanding Officer, 3d Bn., 5th Marines, and Commanding Officer, 3d Bn., 6th Marines:

In accordance with Field Orders No. 9, Headquarters, 2d Division, 30 June, 1918 [Note: this order has to do with a contemplated attack by the 3d Brigade] the 3d Bn., 5th Marines, and the 3d Bn., 6th Marines, are placed at the disposal of the Division Commander. These Battalions will remain in the Bois Gros Jean until further orders and maintain a liaison officer at Division Headquarters from and after the receipt of this order. Harbord.

At 4.40 p.m., June 30th, the Commanding General, Fourth Brigade, issued the following order to the Commanding Officer, Fifth Marines, Commanding Officer, Sixth Marines, Commanding Officer, 6th Machine Gun Bn., Commanding Officer, 1st Bn., 6th Marines, and Commanding Officer, 2d Bn., 6th Marines:

When the 2d Bn., 6th Marines, is withdrawn from the Bois de Belleau it will not be replaced. The 1st Bn., 6th Marines, will hold the Bois alone. The wiring must be completed without delay. Positions selected as strong points should have the rifle pits connected for occupation by squads or platoons according to their location, field of fire, etc. The C. O., 1st Bn., 6th Marines, will consult with the C. O., 5th Marines, and the C. O., 6th Machine Gun Bn., in making the plans for taking over the defense of the entire Bois. The present intention is to relieve the 2d Bn. on the night of the 2d-3d of July. Harbord.

The report of the Commanding General, Fourth Brigade, for the twenty-four hours ending 8 p.m., June 30th, to the Commanding General, Second Division, is as follows:

1. General aspects of the day: Quiet. Weather clear.
2. Events of the day: No events of importance to report. Several patrols sent out from all fronts last night, but unsuccessful in obtaining identifications.
3. Attention is invited to copy of order appended hereto which carries out Division Commander's Order to hold the front of Bois more lightly.
4. With the Division Commander's permission the undersigned visited First Army Corps Headquarters at La Ferte today.
5. Enemy artillery: About as usual. Enemy aviation: About as usual. Nothing further to report. Harbord.

MARINES RELIEVED FROM BELLEAU WOOD

During the night of July 5-6, 1918, the units of the Brigade were relieved and moved to an area in rear of the lines and occupied what

was known as the Line of Defense or Army Line, in the expectation of a threatened large scale German offensive. Brigade Headquarters and Headquarters of the Sixth Machine Gun Battalion were at Nanteuil-sur-Marne; Headquarters of the Fifth Marines were at Crouettes and those of the Sixth Marines at Pisseloupe. The Brigade remained in this area until July 16, 1918.

Field Orders No. 10, Second Division, July 3, 1918, 10 p.m., reads as follows. This order was received by the Brigade Commander at 8.10 p.m., July 4, 1918:

I. The 2d Division will be relieved by the 26th Division in the Sector "PAS FINI."

Relief begins night of July 4-5. Completed night July 8-9.

Command passes July 9th, 8.00 a.m.

II. *Reliefs:*

2d Field Artillery Brigade by 51st Field Artillery Brigade.

3d Brigade by 51st Brigade—in the Sector "Regular."

4th Brigade by 52d Brigade—in the Sector "Marine."

2d Engineers by 101st Engineers.

1st Field Signal Battalion by 101st Field Signal Battalion.

4th Machine Gun Battalion by 101st Machine Gun Battalion.

Trains and Military Police by corresponding units 26th Division.

III. All details of reliefs by sector commanders.

(a) Relieving units 26th Division arrive in Sector, bivouac and relieve units of 2d Division. (Annex I.)

(b) Relieved units 2d Division proceed to new area. (Annex II.)

(c) Strict attention will be paid to march discipline, breaking of columns, and avoidance of aerial observation.

(d) All troop movements will take place between 9.00 p.m. and 3.00 a.m.

(e) Details of relief sanitary troops and turning over of medical services by Division Surgeon.

(f) Military Police will be relieved by echelon. Details by A. P. M.

(g) *Signal Troops:*

Relieving regimental signal corps officer will go in with reconnaissance parties and report to regimental signal corps officer of regiment being relieved. Relieved signal officer will arrange to have one-half of his personnel relieved at each switchboard, radio, T. P. S. and lamp station on the night of the reconnaissance. The following night the remainder of his personnel will be relieved.

Relieved signal officer will take from the sector only his unit equipment of signal property. Other property will be left as sector property and signed for by the relieving officer.

Exchange of apparatus may be effected.

All wire lines not in use will be recovered and carried with the unit being relieved.

Unit signal equipment of organizations will be retained at all times.

IV. An officer from each relieved company, battery or equivalent unit will remain on duty with the relieving unit for twenty-four hours after relief is completed, and before leaving will assure himself that his successor is thoroughly familiar with the situation.

V. Relieved Brigadier Generals and Colonels will remain with their successors for twenty-four hours after relief is completed, and assure themselves before leaving that their successor is thoroughly familiar with the situation.

VI. Command in Brigades and Regiments passes when last element of relieving unit is in place—Division Headquarters to be notified at once.

VII. Sector material will be turned over and receipts therefor transmitted to G-1.

VIII. Telephonic communication concerning relief, forward of Brigade Headquarters, is forbidden.

IX. The 1st Battalion, 30th Engineers, and 1st Flash Ranging Section, pass to "attached 26th Division," July 8th, 9.00 a.m.

X. All intelligence data, maps, plans of defense and codes (other than the Division Telephone Code) will be turned over to relieving officers, receipts obtained and transmitted to G-2.

XI. Administrative details for new area, subject of special memorandum by G-1.

XII. Division Headquarters closes at present location 9 July, 8.00 a.m. Opens at same date and hour at NANTEUIL-les-MEAUX.

BATTLE DEATHS OF MARINES IN THE CHÂTEAU-THIERRY SECTOR AFTER THE AISNE DEFENSIVE

Organization	Killed in		Total
	Action	Wounds	
Headquarters Company, Fifth Regiment	9	6	15
Headquarters Company, Sixth Regiment	1	1	2
Headquarters Company, Sixth Machine Gun Bn.	1	..	1
Headquarters Company, Second Replacement Bn.	1	..	1
Headquarters Company, Fourth Brigade	1	..	1
Supply Company, Sixth Regiment	1	..	1
8th Company	4	5	9
15th Company	7	3	10
16th Company	32	5	37
17th Company	15	13	28
18th Company	28	10	38
20th Company	41	27	68
23rd Company	9	4	13
43rd Company	36	11	47
45th Company	46	8	54

THE BATTLE OF BELLEAU WOOD

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47th Company	30	30	60
49th Company	41	15	56
51st Company	29	29	58
55th Company	26	16	42
66th Company	12	7	19
67th Company	49	12	61
73rd Company	7	6	13
74th Company	14	4	18
75th Company	15	3	18
76th Company	10	3	13
77th Company	1	1	2
78th Company	7	14	21
79th Company	22	12	34
80th Company	14	10	24
81st Company	7	3	10
82nd Company	21	7	28
83rd Company	26	11	37
84th Company	14	3	17
95th Company	12	9	21
96th Company	7	30	37
97th Company	9	5	14
134th Company (Replacement)	1	1
140th Company (Replacement)	2	1	3
146th Company (Replacement)	1	..	1
Total	608	325	933

The battle deaths as divided among the organizations of the Fourth Brigade are as follows:

Organization	Killed in		Total
	Action	Died of Wounds	
Fifth Regiment	398	194	592
Sixth Regiment	180	118	298
Sixth Machine Gun Bn.	25	11	36
Headquarters, Fourth Brigade	1	..	1
Second Replacement Battalion	1	1	2
Third Replacement Battalion	3	1	4
Total	608	325	933

NAME OF BELLEAU WOOD CHANGED

The achievement of the Fourth Brigade of Marines in the Château-Thierry sector was twice recognized by the French in an official manner. The first on June 30, 1918, which changed the name of the Bois de Belleau, was a beautiful tribute spontaneously made to the successes and to the losses of the Fourth Brigade of Marines, and shows the deep effect that the retaking of Belleau Wood and other nearby positions from the Germans had on the feelings of the French and the morale of the Allies. Official maps were immediately modified to conform with the provisions of the order, the *plan directeur* used in later operations bearing the name *Bois de la Brigade de Marine*. The French also used this new name in their orders, as illustrated by an *ordre général* dated August 9, 1918, signed by the Commanding General of the Sixth French Army.

General Order No. 15, Fourth Brigade of Marines, 6 July, 1918, that published the order changing the name of the Bois de Belleau, reads as follows:

The following complimentary order from Headquarters, 6th French Army, is published for the information of the Brigade:

By command of Brigadier General Harbord.

H. LAY,

Major, Adjutant.

VI ARMÉE

Etat-Major

6930/2

au Q. G. A., le 30 Juin 1918

ORDRE

En raison de la brillante conduite de la 4ème Brigade de la 2ème D. U. S. qui a enlevé de haute lutte BOURESCHES et le point d'appui important du Bois de Belleau, défendu avec acharnement par un adversaire nombreux, le Général Commandant la VI ARMÉE décide que dorénavant, dans toutes les pièces officielles, le Bois de BELLEAU portera le nom de *Bois de la Brigade de Marine*.

Le Général de Division DEGOUTTE

Commandant la VI ARMÉE

(Signed) DEGOUTTE

TRANSLATION

Vlth Army

Staff

6930/2

Army H. Q., June 30th, 1918.

ORDER

In view of the brilliant conduct of the 4th Brigade of the 2d U. S. Division, which in a spirited fight took BOURESCHES and the important strong point

of BOIS DE BELLEAU, stubbornly defended by a large enemy force, the General Commanding the Vth Army orders that henceforth, in all official papers, the BOIS DE BELLEAU shall be named *Bois de la Brigade de Marine*.

Division General DEGOUTTE

Commanding Vth Army

(Signed) DEGOUTTE.

CITED BY THE FRENCH

The second official recognition by the French of the Marines' work in the Château-Thierry sector were citations, dated October 22, 1918, of the Fourth Brigade, Fifth and Sixth Regiments, and the Sixth Machine Gun Battalion of Marines, in French Army Orders, that of the brigade, the others being identical, reading as follows:

Was thrown in full battle on a front violently attacked by the enemy. Immediately asserted itself as a unit of first order. On its very entry on the fighting line, broke down, together with the French troops, a violent attack by the enemy on an important part of the position, and began, on its own account, a series of offensive operations. During the course of these operations, thanks to the brilliant courage, the vigor, spirit and tenacity of its men who overcame all hardships and losses; thanks to the activity and energy of its officers; and thanks also to the personal action of its chief, General J. Harbord, the 4th Brigade found its efforts crowned with success. In well coördinated action its two regiments and machine gun battalion realized, after 12 days of incessant fighting (from the 2d to the 13th of June, 1918) on a very difficult terrain, an advance varying from 1200 to 2000 metres, on a front of 4 kilometres, capturing a large amount of material, taking more than 500 prisoners, inflicting on the enemy considerable losses, and capturing two objectives of first importance; the village of Bouresches and Belleau Wood.

The order changing the name of the Bois de Belleau, the citation of the four organizations and the general order of August 9, 1918, above referred to, were published in French in the MARINE CORPS GAZETTE of December, 1919, and also in *The United States Marine Corps in the World War*.

THE FOURRAGÈRE

The above citation was one of the two upon which the French Government based its award of the *fourragère*, in the colors of the Croix de Guerre, to the Fifth and Sixth Regiments and the Sixth Machine Gun Battalion.

APPRECIATION OF FRENCH CIVILIANS

In addition to the above-described instances, French civilian sentiment expressed itself in a letter from the Mayor of Meaux and

Resolution from the assembled Mayors of the Meaux district (Arrondissement). This letter and the resolutions were published on July 10, 1918, in General Orders No. 43, of the Second Division "as indicating the appreciation of the efforts of the Second Division by the French inhabitants for our share in stemming the recent German advance in this sector." This letter was published in the December, 1919, number of the MARINE CORPS GAZETTE and in *The United States Marine Corps in the World War*.

COMMENDATION OF CORPS COMMANDER

General Orders No. 39, June 17, 1918, of the Second Division reads as follows:

1. The Commanding General takes great pleasure and is much gratified to publish to the command the following extract from a letter from the Corps Commander, commending the accomplishments of the division during the recent operations:

"The movements and operations of the 2d Division from May 31st to date have been followed by the Corps Commander with great pride and satisfaction. During this period the Division has not only accomplished 'a successful march,' including forced and night marches under extremely difficult conditions, but has repelled concentrated attacks delivered by a highly trained enemy and has counter-attacked with signal and unvaried success. Only trained and well-led troops of high morale could accomplish so much in so short a period of time with relatively small losses.

"Please convey to the soldiers and officers of your command my keenest appreciation and heartiest congratulations."

COMMENDATIONS OF GENERAL PERSHING

A copy of the following telegram from General Pershing, addressed to the Commanding General, Second Division, referring to the attacks on June 6th, was received at Brigade Headquarters on June 9th:

Please accept for the Division and convey to Brigadier General Harbord and the officers and men under him my sincere congratulations for the splendid conduct of the attack on the German lines north of Château-Thierry. It was a magnificent example of American courage and dash. Pershing.

The Commanding General, Second Division, in forwarding the above telegram to the Brigade placed upon it the following indorsement:

The Division Commander takes this occasion to renew his expression of

gratification over the fine conduct of all units of the Division during the past week.

General Order No. 13, Fourth Brigade of Marines, June 30, 1918, reads as follows:

The Brigade Commander takes the keenest pride and pleasure in publishing to the command the correspondence which appears below. In addition the American and French Corps Commanders, and the Commanding General, 2d Division (Regular) have personally called and expressed their pride and satisfaction in not only the events referred to in this correspondence, but in the achievements of the 4th Brigade, U. S. Marines, A. E. F., throughout this month of practically continuous fighting. The Brigade has been fortunate in rendering this service at a fateful moment of the war. It is believed that the history of the U. S. Marine Corps will write the *Bois de Belleau, Bouresches* and *Hill 142* on the tablets which already carry Tripoli, Mexico, China and other names immortalized in our traditions.

By command of Brigadier General Harbord.

H. LAY,

Major, Adjutant.

HEADQUARTER FIRST ARMY CORPS

June 29, 1918.

From: Chief of Staff, 1st Army Corps.

To: Commanding General, 2d Division, American E.F.

Subject: Recent operations.

1. The following communication has just been received from the Commander-in-Chief:

"Commanding General First Army Corps, A. E. F., Le Ferte.

"Please congratulate in my name those officers and men who took part in the action in the Château-Thierry region on the afternoon of June twenty-fifth when two hundred forty prisoners and nineteen machine guns were captured from the enemy.

"Pershing,
"General."

2. The Corps Commander will extend these congratulations in person this date.

3. The Corps Commander desires that in addition to his personal action, the foregoing congratulations of the Commander-in-Chief be extended by you with a view to insuring that the interests and satisfaction of higher authority may reach all concerned.

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

1st Ind.

Hdqrs. 2nd Division, A. E. F., 29th June, '18—To C. G., 4th Brigade.

1. The Division Commander takes great pride in transmitting the above and in again expressing his thanks and congratulations to the officers and men engaged in the last offensive against the enemy in the Bois-de-Belleau. They conducted this operation with gallantry and skill of which no praise is too great. It is desired that this telegram, from the Commander-in-Chief, reach all officers and men who took part in this brilliant action.

PRESTON BROWN,
Colonel, General Staff,
Chief of Staff.

CONGRATULATIONS OF GENERAL PERSHING AND GENERAL FOCH

Brigadier General Harbord issued the following order to the Fourth Brigade on June 9, 1918:

The Brigade Commander takes pride in announcing that to the Commander-in-Chief's telegram of congratulation to the 4th Brigade published in an endorsement from the Division Commander dated June 9th, General Pershing has today visited Division Headquarters and sent his personal greetings and congratulations to the Marine Brigade. He also added that General Foch, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies in France, especially charged him this morning to give the Marine Brigade his love and congratulations on their fine work of the past week.

COMPLIMENTS OF THE TWENTY-SIXTH DIVISION

The following communication was received June 12, 1918, by the Fourth Brigade from the Second Division:

To: Commanding General, Fourth Brigade.

The Division Commander takes pleasure in sending you a copy of the following letter received today:

Headquarters, 26th Division, Am. E. F.
10 June 1918


Major General Omar Bundy,
Second Division,
American Expeditionary Forces.

Dear Bige:

Accept the congratulations of the 26th Division as well as those of its commander for the fine work of the Second Division. We are all proud of you. Our compliments to your brigade commanders and colonels.

Faithfully yours,

C. R. Edwards.




THE "PLAN DIRECTEUR" OF THE FRENCH ARMY
Used by the American Expeditionary Forces, on which appears the new name of Bois de la Belleau—"Bois de la Brigade de Marine."

VI^e ARMEE

Etat-Major

6930/c

du 2.7.44, le 30 Juin 1944



ORDRE
-1-1-1-

En raison de la brillante conduite de la 4ème
Brigade de la 2ème D.U.S. qui a enlevé de haute lutte
BOURESCHES et le point d'appui important du Bois de
BELLEAU, défendu avec acharnement par un adversaire
nombreux, le Général Commandant la VI^e ARMEE décide que
d'ores et maintenant, dans toutes les pièces officielles, le Bois
de BELLEAU portera le nom de "Bois de la Brigade de
Marine".

Le Général de Division DEGOUTTE
Commandant la VI^e ARMEE

Degoutte.

✓ Le Général Cdt la 4ème Brigade de Marine
s/c. de M.le Général Cdt la 2ème D.U.S.

GENERAL DEGOUTTE'S ORDER CHANGING THE NAME OF THE
"BOIS DE BELLEAU"

HEARTY CONGRATULATIONS OF THE BRITISH MARINES

General Order No. 14, Fourth Brigade, July 5, 1918, reads as follows:

The following telegram and reply thereto are published for the information of the Brigade:

Received at: London Jul 4 18

Brigadier General Hdqrs Marine Brigade

LaFerte Sous Jouarre.

On behalf of the Royal Marines I send you and all ranks of the United States Marine Corps our heartiest congratulations on the auspicious day and may the future years bring us still closer together.

David Meyer, Major General, Adjutant General
Royal Marines, London. 8:11 p.m.

Headquarters, Fourth Brigade,
Marines, Am E. F.
5th July 1918.

My dear General Meyer:

I acknowledge the receipt of your congratulatory telegram of July 4th, and thank you on behalf of the 4th Brigade, U. S. Marines, for your good wishes. The wish of the Royal Marines for closer relations between our two Corps finds an echo in our hearts. It has given me great pleasure to publish your telegram to my Brigade, and to forward a copy to our Major General Commandant in America, who speaking in behalf of the whole U. S. Marine Corps, will no doubt concur in our thanks and good wishes to you and the Royal Marines.

Sincerely yours,

J. G. HARBORD,
Brigadier-General, N. A.,
Commanding.

A GERMAN OPINION

An official German Army report was captured in July, 1918, on an officer taken in the Marne region, and part of the document reads as follows:

The 2d American Division may be classified as a very good division, perhaps even as assault troops. The various attacks of both regiments on Belleau Wood were carried out with dash and recklessness. The moral effect of our firearms did not materially check the advance of the infantry. The nerves of the Americans are still unshaken.

COMMENTS OF PRESIDENT WILSON

President Wilson, in presenting the Peace Treaty and the League of Nations to the Senate, spoke, on July 10, 1919, in part as follows:

That first never-to-be-forgotten action at Château-Thierry had already taken place. Our redoubtable Soldiers and Marines had already closed the gap the enemy had succeeded in opening for their advance upon Paris—had already turned the tide of battle back toward the frontiers of France and begun the rout that was to save Europe and the World. Thereafter the Germans were to be always forced back, back; were never to thrust successfully forward again. * * *

PREMIER CLEMENCEAU COMMENDS

During the latter part of June, 1918, Premier Clemenceau visited Second Division Headquarters for the purpose of congratulating and thanking the Marine Brigade for their achievements. The newspapers of this period contained full accounts of this visit. In an indorsement to the First Army Corps, American Expeditionary Forces, Major General Bundy, on June 29, 1918, stated as follows: "M. Clemenceau was informed of the gallant and successful work of the Fourth Brigade and was invited to visit the Brigade Commander which the shortness of his stay prevented. * * * It is desired that it be brought to the attention of M. Clemenceau that the Division Commander and all others who have knowledge of the subject are unstinted in their words of praise of the gallant conduct of the Fourth Brigade in the Bois de Belleau and elsewhere on this front during the past month."

FROM THE FIFTH REGIMENT HISTORY

The following extract is from the History of the Fifth Regiment, prepared while the regiment was in Germany:

Colonel Wendell C. Neville commanded the Regiment throughout the entire engagement. Lieutenant Colonel Logan Feland was his Second-in-Command. These two officers, with Brigadier General Harbord in command of the Fourth Brigade of Marines, made our leadership incomparable. It was here that Brigadier General Harbord learned to love the Marines and to take pride in wearing their emblems, and it was here that Colonel Neville displayed those qualities of leadership which in a short time were to be devoted to the guidance of the Brigade with great distinction through all its later engagements. Lieutenant Colonel Feland first came to be known and loved by the officers and enlisted men of the Fifth Regiment. Almost every day he might

be seen along the lines, encouraging the officers and enlisted men and improving the situation by wise suggestions. On several occasions, he relieved tired Battalion Commanders in order that they might go to the rear for a time and gain much needed rest and food.

COMPLIMENTS OF FRENCH THIRD ARMY CORPS

General Order No. 12, Fourth Brigade, June 26, 1918, reads as follows:

The Brigade Commander takes the keenest pride in publishing to the Brigade the following messages from the Commanding Generals 3rd Army Corps (French) and the 2nd Division, A. E. F. (regular), regarding the engagement at the north end of Bois de Belleau on the night of June 25-26, 1918.

"11.25 p.m.—June 25, 1918.

"From the Staff, 3rd Army Corps (French), to the Staff, 2nd Division, U. S.

"The Commanding General, 3rd Army Corps, sends to the Commanding General, 2nd Division, U. S., his compliments for the very fine success won by the Commanding General 4th Brigade. He begs him to transmit them to the infantry troops and artillerymen who coöperated in this splendid success.

"To the C. G., 4th Brigade, with the compliments of the Division Commander."

The organizations participating in the artillery preparation were the 12th and 17th U. S. Field Artillery and the French Groupement Gouvry. The unit that made the attack was the 3rd Battalion, 5th Regiment, U. S. Marines.

THE COMMENDATION OF THE DIVISION COMMANDER

General Orders No. 41, Second Division, July 10, 1918, reads as follows:

1. After more than a month of continuous fighting, the division has been withdrawn from the first lines. It is with inexpressible pride and satisfaction that your commander recounts your glorious deeds on the field of battle.

2. In the early days of June, on a front of twenty kilometres, after night marches, and with only the reserve rations which you carried, you stood like a wall against the enemy advance on Paris. For this timely action you have received the thanks of the French people whose homes you saved, and the generous praise of your comrades in arms.

3. Since the organization of our sector, in the face of strong opposition, you have advanced your lines two kilometres on a front of eight kilometres. You have engaged and defeated with great loss three German divisions, and have occupied the important strong points of the Belleau Woods, Bouresches, and Vaux. You have taken about fourteen hundred prisoners, many machine guns, and much other material. The complete success of the infantry was made possible by the splendid coöperation of the artillery, by the aid and assistance of the engineer and signal troops, by the diligent, watchful care of the

medical and supply services, and by the unceasing work of a well-trained staff. All elements of the division have worked together in perfect harmony as a great machine. Amid the dangers and trials of battle, every officer and every man has done well his part. Let the stirring deeds, the hardships, the sacrifices of the past month remain forever a bright spot in our history. Let the sacred memory of our fallen comrades spur us on to renewed efforts to add to the glory of American arms.

GENERAL DEGOUTTE PRESENTED SOUVENIRS

Early in July as shown by the following memorandum of the Second Division, dated July 4, 1918, General Degoutte forwarded to the Second Division souvenir gifts to be distributed among the personnel of the division, and the Marines received their portion.

The Commanding General directs me to send you the accompanying souvenirs for such distribution as you deem just, among the enlisted men of your command. He is desirous that you inform the recipients of the source of the souvenirs. The letter below is published for your information.

Vith Army
STAFF

Army Headquarters, 3 July 1918.
Division General DEGOUTTE
Commanding the Vith Army
to
General Bundy
Commanding the 2nd Division, U. S. A.

Upon the occasion of his recent visit to my headquarters, General PETAIN, Commander-in-Chief of the French Armies, was good enough to leave with me a number of souvenirs which are to be distributed among the soldiers of the Vith Army.

I thought that the American soldiers, fighting in the ranks of the Vith Army, might like to receive a share of these souvenirs.

I have the honor of sending them to you with the request to distribute them among the victors of the BOIS-DE-BELLEAU, BOURESCHES and VAUX.

(Signed) DEGOUTTE.

A MARINE RECEIVED FIRST MEDAL OF HONOR

Gunnery Sergeant Charles F. Hoffman, 49th Company, Fifth Marines, was the first member of the American Expeditionary Forces to be awarded a Medal of Honor. His citation follows:

Charles F. Hoffman, gunnery sergeant, 49th Company, 5th Regiment, United States Marine Corps. For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity above and beyond the call of duty in action with the enemy near Château-Thierry, France, June 6, 1918. Immediately after the company to which he belonged had reached its objective on Hill 142 several hostile counter-attacks were

launched against the line before the new position had been consolidated. Sergt. Hoffman was attempting to organize a position on the north slope of the hill when he saw 12 of the enemy, armed with five light machine guns, crawling toward his group. Giving the alarm, he rushed the hostile detachment, bayoneted the two leaders, and forced the others to flee, abandoning their guns. His quick action, initiative, and courage drove the enemy from a position from which they could have swept the hill with machine gun fire and forced the withdrawal of our troops.

MANY MARINES DECORATED

In addition to the many foreign decorations, such as the French Croix de Guerre, awarded to the Marines for heroism and gallantry during the operations in the Marne Salient between June 6 and July 1, 1918, one enlisted man was awarded the Medal of Honor (the first awarded to any person in the American Expeditionary Forces), Brigadier General Harbord and three Marine officers were awarded the Distinguished Service Medal, 48 Marine officers and 96 enlisted men were awarded the Distinguished Service Cross.

MARINES CONCENTRATED ON THE ARMY DEFENSE LINE

Field Orders No. 11, July 5, 1918, 10 p.m., reads as follows. This order was received by the Brigade Commander at 12 noon, July 6, 1918:

I. Information indicates an attack by the enemy in force on the line: REIMS-CHÂTEAU-THIERRY.

Our aviators report a massing of his aviation squadrons, and the concentration of bridge material north of the Marne, east of CHÂTEAU-THIERRY. He has concentrated fire on HILL 204 and registers on the front line of our 3rd Brigade.

II. The Division (less the 4th Brigade) *reinforced by the 52nd Brigade*, 26th Division, will hold the zone of Advance Posts and Zone of Principal Resistance in the sector "PAS FINI."

The 26th Division (less the 52nd Brigade) *reinforced by the 4th Brigade*, 2nd Division, holds the Army defensive line: LE BARRE-BEZU-SABBLON-NIERE-DHUISY-LES BRULIS.

Its artillery, in position, covers the front of this line. Liaison is established with the 39th Division to the right—the 167th Division to the left.

III. (a) The 2nd Field Artillery Brigade, remaining in position, covers the front of the division.

(b) The 4th Brigade will be concentrated on the Army defense line: LE BARRE (inclusive)—Southern edge BOIS ESSERTIS (northwest of BEZU), inclusive.

SUB-SECTORS:

5th Marines: LE BARRE (inclusive)-Point 171.00-254.00, North of Hill 199 (exclusive).

6th Marines: Western limit 5th Marines (inclusive)-Southern edge of BOIS ESSERTIS (exclusive).

(c) The 5th Marines (less 1st Bn. and Machine Gun Co.) will march at once to CROUTTES and go into position.

The 1st Battalion and Machine Gun Company, 5th Marines, upon being relieved in the sub-sector "Marine" will join their regiment.

(d) The 6th Marines will go into position and connect with the left of the 5th Marines.

(e) The 6th Machine Gun Battalion will accompany the 6th Marines and is at disposition Brigade Commander.

(f) The 52nd Brigade, 26th Division, will complete the relief of the 4th Brigade in the sub-sector "Marine" with the least possible delay.

(g) All other troops remain in place.

(x) In case of attack the Commanding General, 2nd Division, retains command of troops in the Zone of the Advance Posts and Zones of Principal Resistance. The Commanding General, 26th Division, will assume command of American troops on the Army Line.

Guides will meet the 5th Marines at MERY; the 6th Marines at the office of the A. P. M. at MONTREUIL-aux-LIONS, who will indicate the location of the Army Line and sector to be occupied.

IV. The Division Signal Officer will establish lines of information from Division Headquarters to NANTEUIL-sur-MARNE, and the P. C.'s of the 5th and 6th Marines.

Trains and services remain in place.

V. Headquarters 4th Brigade, 2nd Division. NANTEUIL-sur-MARNE.

Headquarters 52nd Brigade, 26th Division: LA LOGE.

Headquarters 26th Division: Chamigny.

Headquarters 2nd Division: UNCHANGED.

PROFESSIONAL NOTES

RECRUITING AND DISTRIBUTION OF THE MARINE CORPS

RECRUITING for the Marine Corps was carried on for the months of August, September and October with the following results:

AUGUST, 1920

	Reënltts	Applicants Accept.	Total
Eastern Division	210	276	486
Central Division	159	292	451
Southern Division	50	111	161
Mountain Division	20	70	90
Western Division	48	99	147
<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
Total	487	848	1335

PERIOD OF ENLISTMENT

	2 years	3 years	4 years	Total
Eastern Division	429	17	40	486
Central Division	427	11	13	451
Southern Division	155	2	4	161
Mountain Division	79	8	3	90
Western Division	134	8	5	147
<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
Total	1224	46	65	1335

Total enlistments recorded in August, 1920 1162

Gain in strength in August, 1920 480

SEPTEMBER, 1920

	Reënltts	Applicants Accept.	Total
Eastern Division	255	412	667
Central Division	153	328	481
Southern Division	56	121	177
Mountain Division	29	111	140
Western Division	58	133	191
<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
Total	551	1105	1656

PERIOD OF ENLISTMENT

	2 years	3 years	4 years	Total
Eastern Division	602	17	48	667
Central Division	449	19	13	481
Southern Division	166	5	6	177
Mountain Division	128	8	4	140
Western Division	171	11	9	191
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
Total	1516	60	80	1656

Total enlistments recorded in September, 1920 1468
 Gain in strength in September, 1920 786

OCTOBER, 1920

	Reenlts	Applicants Acpt.	Total
Eastern Division	232	482	714
Central Division	127	350	477
Southern Division	51	157	208
Mountain Division	27	122	149
Western Division	99	185	284
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
Total	536	1296	1832

PERIOD OF ENLISTMENT

	2 years	3 years	4 years	Total
Eastern Division	626	30	58	714
Central Division	432	32	13	477
Southern Division	196	4	8	208
Mountain Division	134	9	6	149
Western Division	245	21	18	284
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
Total	1633	96	103	1832

Total enlistments recorded in October, 1920 1502
 Gain in strength in October, 1920 895

RECAPITULATION OF STRENGTH OF MARINE CORPS, OCTOBER 31, 1920

	Auth.	Total Present Strength	Regulars	D. W. men	Res.
United States .	18,874	11,573	11,217	69	11
Foreign	6,286	4,832	4,821	11	0
Ships	1,822	1,538	1,537	1	0
Enroute, etc ...	418	593	593	0	0
Grand total .	27,400	18,536	18,168	81	11

NOTE: 276 applicants are included in total present strength, but are not classified; 71 in Marine Band are not included in above figure.

THE MARINE CORPS SCHOOLS

[NOTE.—This information is furnished by the Commanding Officer, Marine Corps Schools.]

The Marine Corps Schools was organized August 1, 1920, and is the combination of what was formerly The Marine Officers' Infantry School and The Marine Officers' Training School. These designations have been changed under the new organization to The Field Officers' School and The Company Officers' School, which together constitute The Marine Corps Schools.

PERSONNEL OF THE SCHOOLS

The School personnel consists of the Commanding Officer, the School Staff, the students, and the School Detachment.

THE COMMANDING OFFICER

The Commanding Officer is charged with the immediate administration of the school, the coördination of the work of the instruction, and the maintaining of the proper standard of discipline among the students and enlisted men.

THE DIRECTORS OF INSTRUCTION

There are two directors of instruction, one for the Field Officers' School and one for the Company Officers' School. They are charged with the immediate supervision and coördination of the work in their respective schools.

THE ADJUTANT AND SECRETARY

This officer has charge of all correspondence, records, school library, and distributes instruction bulletins and pamphlets of the correspondence course.

THE SCHOOL BOARD

The School Board consists of the Commanding Officer, the two directors and the heads of the several departments. It arranges the course of instruction as to subjects, methods, and allotment of time. It also makes recommendations as to the policy, character and scope of the schools.

The Course of Instruction, Field Officers' School:

OUTLINE OF THE PRESENT COURSE

Based on the experience gained in the course pursued in the Marine Officers' Infantry School of 1920, the following course was formulated for this year. The actual instruction covers thirty-eight weeks of from four to five hours per day for five days and two hours on Saturday mornings, leaving Saturday afternoons and holidays free. Holidays are Thanksgiving Day, Washington's Birthday, Decoration Day; Christmas Holiday commences at noon Friday December 23rd and ends at 9.00 a.m., January the 3rd.

The total number of hours for the entire course is 750, divided among the four departments as follows:

Department of Tactics	400 hours
Department of Topography	200 hours
Department of Law	140 hours
Department of Administration	10 hours

In laying out the course every effort was made to make it such that the student's interest would be maintained throughout the entire period, and to eliminate, as far as possible, any feature that might be considered a grind.

The schedule of the various departments is so arranged that the study of certain subjects essential to a study of the other subjects shall be completed before the other subjects are taken up, thus making it progressive.

THE COURSE IN MILITARY TACTICS

In a broad sense the course in tactics as outlined below aims to develop correct thinking and the correct applications of the accepted principles and doctrines of tactics to situations that might readily confront any officer during field service. During the course the teaching of normal formations and the laying down of hard and fast rules will be purposely avoided and by meeting realistic situations with sensible methods the subject will be kept alive, and the student's interest awakened. The course is planned to meet the practical needs of the field officers of the Marine Corps and furnish them something tangible upon which to lean when they take the field as commanders of troops.

The field officers' course in tactics will follow in general the subject as taught at the Army School of the Line. It is not, however, as large in its scope or as comprehensive in some respects as at Leavenworth. On the other hand, some subjects that have a peculiar relation to Marine Corps needs have been treated in more comprehensive and detailed fashion.

While the army is rightly our guide in all matters pertaining to tactical doctrines and supply methods, an attempt has been made to preserve the characteristics of the school. In order that its character as a Marine Corps school may not be lost but rather developed and grow as the school matures the peculiarities of the duties of the Marine Corps and its distinctive characteristics have not been overlooked in planning the course.

We differ from the army first in mobility. The Marine Corps is essentially light infantry and as such must move quickly. As our organization and equipment must never interfere with this important characteristic the course will include conferences and problems involving the peculiar organization, equipment and

function of Marine Corps troops in tasks that they are likely to undertake.

Our functions differ from the army again in that small bodies of Marine Corps must often act independently. This makes it highly important that the school develop initiative, correct thinking and ready decision on the part of our subordinate officers. Troop leading and problems requiring independent thought and decision will be emphasized in order to meet this need of our officers.

The course includes the following subjects which will be taken up in the order named:

Military Organizations.—This subject comprises the detailed organization of all separate arms and services that compose a division, and a general discussion of the principles that control the organization of each. The organization of the corps, army and service of supply are treated in sufficient detail to assure the student's understanding of their importance and relation to the infantry division.

Tactics and Technic of Separate Arms.—This course covers the characteristics, powers and limitations and the tactics peculiar to each arm and service and their relation to each other. It is essential that this be gone into very thoroughly for the reason that there have been so many changes in the methods and usages incident to the introduction of new arms and modern equipment that the probabilities are that the student will have had little if any experience, either practical or theoretical, in the handling and employment of the different arms.

The arms and services covered are the infantry and special weapons, machine guns, tanks, field artillery, cavalry, air service, signal troops, engineers, sanitary troops, and chemical warfare.

Tactical Principles and Decisions.—This subject is an important feature of the course, covering, as it does, the recognized principles and accepted doctrines of warfare and their correct application to situations common to wartime service. The infantry division or smaller units as part of a division, will be the standard unit for all problems used in teaching this subject. The object in basing these problems on a division is not to train officers to handle such a large unit (such is not understood to be the purpose of the school), but to keep in the minds of the students the necessity for teamwork, and impress on them the

importance of the division as a grand tactical unit. In other words, to give them the same understanding that exists in the minds of those officers who served in the A. E. F.; namely, that everything tactical revolves around or is related to the division. Another reason for doing this is the preëminent fitness of the division for illustrating and teaching tactical principles and decisions.

In addition to the above this subject includes a thorough treatment of the means of arriving at a correct decision and the technic and method of promulgating the will of the commander to the troops; i.e., orders.

This general subject includes a detailed study of marches, security, reconnaissance, action of covering forces, the offensive, including position in readiness, meeting engagements, river crossings, landing on hostile shores, the attack under various conditions, and the pursuit, defense including delaying action, counter-attack and defensive action in both organized and hastily prepared positions.

In addition, this subject will comprise lectures, conference, and problems in minor warfare. That is, the strategy and tactics suitable to action against unorganized or partly organized forces such as the Marine Corps is frequently called upon to operate against.

Supply.—The question of supply is of such major importance and has such a close relationship to tactics that supply methods in general and the detailed system of supply within a division are included in the tactical course.

Logistics.—Under the heading of logistics is taught all the details connected with the movement of troops by march, rail, bus, and transport.

Duties of the Division Commander and Staff.—This subject covers the functions of each department of divisional headquarters, the detailed duties of each member of the staff and how they are brought together to assure coöperation and team-play. Such questions as message centres, information service and the relation of the staff to the troops commanders are all gone into. After the above subjects have been taken up separately the students are taken into a situation in which a division is shown in camp, on the march, in an attack, during a retreat, etc., and in that way give a clear understanding of the functions of the staff in various situations.

Troop Leading.—The troop-leading course endeavors to show the functions, duties, and teamwork of the various elements of a division and their mutual relation as affected by the decisions and orders of the commander of the whole. This leads to the precise details of handling regiments, battalions, platoons, companies, and even smaller units to accomplish the will of the supreme commander.

The Tactical Course is shown in the accompanying diagram.

COURSE IN TOPOGRAPHY

This course is divided into Map Reading, Surveying and sketching.

With the exception of a certain amount of theoretical work in the beginning of the course, it is mostly practical. A considerable amount of instruction and practical work is done on the sand table, but by far the greater part is in the field.

The primary object of this course is to insure that each student becomes thoroughly familiar with map reading.

The course in sketching and surveying is made subsidiary to the main object, both are valuable aids to the student in becoming well grounded and proficient with the interpretations of maps in general.

Secondary to map reading the course is laid out with the idea of meeting the following conditions:

(a) To enable an officer to realize both the possibilities and the limitations of maps made by the different methods, applicable to military work.

(b) To understand the various methods of mapping and possibilities of producing maps for military purposes with the personnel attached to infantry organizations.

(c) To enable the officer to organize and direct topographical work in the field, and to coöperate with technical troops engaged in this work.

The Topographical Course is shown in the accompanying diagram.

COURSE IN LAW

The law course is divided into Criminal Law, International Law, and Military Government.

Criminal Law.—In this course is taken up the Law of Evidence

which is gone into very thoroughly, and Court-Martial Procedure. The study in the latter subject is sufficiently extensive to insure the student being well versed in all matters pertaining to court-martial work. Practical work in this subject will consist of problems based entirely on cases taken from Court-Martial Orders, selecting those that furnish examples of the most common and serious errors.

International Law and Military Government.—In the study of these subjects, the information gathered from the World War, the occupation of Germany and former occupations, will be fully utilized.

In this course there will be a series of lectures on the administration of civil affairs by the military when occupying the territory of a nation with which the United States is at peace. This is a duty frequently devolving upon Marines and so should prove of great value to the students.

Reviews in the law course will, as far as possible, consist of practical problems on subject matter previously covered in lectures and conferences.

The Law Course is shown in the accompanying diagram.

COURSE IN ADMINISTRATION

The course in Administration will consist of a series of seven lectures divided as follows:

Adjutant and Inspector's Department	Two
Quartermaster's Department	Three
Paymaster's Department	Two

These lectures will describe the duties, functions, and methods of the different staff departments.

The main object of having these lectures as a part of the Field Officers' School is to impress on the students the necessity for coöperation and coördination between the line and staff, and to give them a broader view of the scope and limitation of the work in these departments.

COURSE IN HORSEMANSHIP

This course includes hippology and equitation. It will be conducted by means of lectures, demonstrations, and practice in riding. It will be extensive enough for the students to obtain a knowledge of the essentials of this subject.

TESTS OF PROFICIENCY

The method of rating students is based on the number of units obtained by them in the various tests and problems. The total value of all tests and problems is 500 units. This is subdivided as follows:

Tactics	350
Topography	100
Law	50

METHOD OF INSTRUCTION

The method of instruction includes conferences, lectures, tests, problems and demonstrations.

There is a considerable amount of study and theoretical work required of the student, but his ability to do the practical work of the course is the ultimate goal. This method we believe will have a tendency to prevent too much memorizing and to make greater use of good common sense.

THE COURSE OF INSTRUCTION—COMPANY OFFICERS' SCHOOL—
OUTLINE OF THE COURSE


The Company Officers' School will not commence until after the 1st of January, 1921, as it is the Major General Commandant's desire to have the student body composed of those officers of the rank of lieutenant and captain, who will have been selected for permanent commissions by the present Board. The schedule of studies will therefore have to be arranged so that the length of the course will not be over six months, to be complete on June 30, 1921.

In order that this may be accomplished the School Board has decided that the course for 1921, with a few modifications, will

THE DEPARTMENT OF MILITARY TACTICS
FIELD OFFICERS SCHOOL
MARINE CORPS SCHOOL
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MILITARY TOPOGRAPHY




NAVAL OFFICERS' SCHOOL
M B, QUANTICO, VA.

APPROVED: *[Signature]*
Lieutenant Colonel, USAF
Communications, Materiel

MILITARY TOPOGRAPHY

COURSE
IN
MILITARY LAW.

THE DEPARTMENT
OF MILITARY LAW
FIELD OFFICERS' SCHOOL
MARINE CORPS SCHOOLS
M.B. QUANTICO, VA.



COURSE IN MILITARY LAW

follow in a general way the one pursued in the Marine Officers' Training School for 1920.

The actual instruction covers twenty-three weeks, from January 15, 1921, to June 30, 1921, of four to five hours per day for five days and two hours on Saturdays, leaving Saturday afternoons and holidays free. Holidays are Washington's Birthday, Easter Monday and Decoration Day.

Total number of hours of the entire course is 620, divided among the following subjects:

Infantry Drill Regulations, Manual of Interior Guard Duty, Signals (wig-wag and semaphore), Naval Ordnance, Tactics, Infantry Weapons, Engineering, Administration, Topography, Law, First Aid and Medical Hygiene, Musketry, Physical Training, Equitation, boat drill and duties of Marine Officers on board ship.

GENERAL OFFICERS WITH THE BRITISH MARINES

WE learn from the *United Service Gazette* that the British Marines are to have eight general officers, borne on a list common to the Royal Marine Artillery and Royal Marine Light Infantry, consisting of one general, two lieutenant generals, and five major generals.

REORGANIZATION OF HEADQUARTERS MARINE CORPS

[NOTE.—The appended memorandum shows the reorganization of Marine Corps Headquarters, which took effect December 1, 1920.]

December 1, 1920.

HEADQUARTERS MEMORANDUM

1. Under the direction of the Major General Commandant, the business of Headquarters U. S. Marine Corps will be conducted by the three staff departments and by the following, *viz.*:

Division of Operations and Training

Personnel Section

Recruiting Section

Educational Section

2. The Assistant to the Commandant will be the Executive of the Major General Commandant. He will assist the Major Gen-

eral Commandant in the performance of his duties, especially with reference to the Division of Operations and Training and the above-mentioned sections.

3. The duties of the three staff departments will be the same as heretofore.

4. The Division of Operations and Training will have cognizance of the following:

(a) *Operations:*

Mobilization

Movement of advanced base and expeditionary forces

Expeditions

Advanced Bases

War Plans

Preparedness reports

Secret files

Organization

Organization reports

Establishment and abandonment of posts and detachments

Distribution of Marine Corps

(b) *Training:*

Military training and instruction

Military schools

Recruit depots

Target practice

Target ranges

Military training—reserve forces

Military text-books

(c) *Military Intelligence:*

(d) *Military Matériel:*

Expeditionary and advanced base outfits

Ordnance matériel

Military equipment

Inventions

The procurement, accountability and issue to the service of the articles listed under (d) will continue, as at present, to be the function of the Quartermaster's Department.

(e) *Aviation:*

Matériel

Training (active and reserve aviation forces)

Air service reports

Air service qualifications

Air service and land forces in coöperation

The head of this division will be designated as "The Director of Operations and Training."

5. The Personnel Section will have charge of the following:

(a) *Officers:*

Appointments

Assignments to duty

Maintenance of complements of posts, detachments and other organizations

Leaves of absence

Detail of officers for courts and boards

Medical surveys

Constabulary detachments

Passports

Transportation of officers and officers' families on naval transports

(b) *Enlisted Men:*

Maintenance of complements of posts, detachments and other organizations

Transfers

Furloughs

Commutation of quarters and rations

Transportation on naval transports

Medical surveys

Appointments to the Naval Academy

Detail of specialists

Morale and welfare work

6. The Recruiting Section will have charge of recruiting and the recruiting service.

7. The Educational Section will have charge of the following:

The Marine Corps Institute

Correspondence course

Post schools (other than military)

Enrollments in schools

School supplies, text-books, etc.

JOHN A. LEJEUNE,
Major General Commandant.

EDITORIAL NOTES

THE attention of all active members is again invited to the questionnaires which were sent out several months ago to all active members requesting their vote, either affirmative or negative, on a proposed change in the constitution of the Marine Corps Association. The proposed change would make eligible for associate membership *all* enlisted men of the Marine Corps, instead of only those of the rank of gunnery sergeant and above, as is the case at present.

All active members are requested, if they have not already done so, to inform the Secretary-Treasurer of their opinion on the matter, either by filling out the form on the questionnaire or otherwise. Of those who have already sent in their votes, an overwhelming majority is in favor of the change but it is not possible to put it into effect, since a majority of the active members of the association have not been heard from.

Due to the increased cost of publishing the MARINE CORPS GAZETTE and also difficulty in obtaining advertising, it has been found necessary to raise the dues of Associate Members of the Association to \$2 per year. The previous figure, \$1, did not cover the net cost of printing and mailing one copy of the GAZETTE for the four issues per year, so that the more Associate Members we had, the worse were we off financially.

